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CBOE Stock Study (10-4-26)

Posted by on September 8, 2026 at 06:58 | Last modified: October 4, 2026 15:34

I recently studied CBOE Global Markets, Inc. (CBOE) with a closing price of $271.26.

M* writes:

     > Founded in 1973, Cboe controls the largest option exchange in
     > the US, which provides around 60% of the firm’s revenue. The
     > company is best known for its proprietary S&P 500 and VIX
     > index options, which it offers through an exclusive contract
     > with S&P Global. The firm moved into US and European equities
     > through the $3.4 billion acquisition of BATS in 2017. Cboe
     > has continued to look to expand internationally, using
     > acquisitions to build a presence in both Canada and Australia.

Over the past decade, this medium-size company has grown sales and EPS at annualized rates of 16.3% and 13.2%. Lines are mostly up, straight, and parallel except for sales dips in ’19 and ’23, an EPS dip in ’19, and a larger EPS decline in ’22 (one-time impairment charge due to mid-2022 acquisition of ErisX). Five- (10-) year EPS R^2 is 0.52 (0.56), and Value Line (VL) gives an Earnings Predictability score of 45. Shares outstanding increase a noticeable 29.1% (2.9% per year).

Over the past decade, PTPM is less than peer and industry averages while falling from 46.7% to 33.2% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 24.0%. ROE is less than peer and industry averages while falling from 63.7% to 22.3% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 16.4% (shareholder equity consistently positive and increasing 6.5%/year since ’17). Debt-to-Capital is less than peer and industry averages despite increasing from zero to 23.6% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 28.6%.

Quick Ratio is 0.8 and Interest Coverage 35 per M* who assigns a “Narrow” Economic Moat, “Standard” rating for Capital Allocation, and a B grade for Financial Health (per BI website). VL gives an A rating for Financial Strength.

RightStock—a new tool on the BI website that I will be tracking for informational purposes—gives a fitness score of 75 and opportunity score of 88.

With regard to sales growth:

My 6.0% forecast is toward lower end of the range (excluding M*’s puzzling short-term ACE).

With regard to EPS growth:

My 7.0% per year forecast is near bottom of the long-term-estimate range (mean of seven: 12.4%). Initial value is ’25 EPS of $10.42/share rather than 2026 Q2 EPS of $12.83 (TTM).

My Forecast High P/E is 25.0. Over the past 10 years, high P/E falls from 34.0 to 25.2 (’25) with last-5-year mean of 27.5 (excluding ’22 upside outlier of 59.6) and a last-5-year-mean average P/E of 23.1 (also excluding ’22 low P/E upside outlier of 47.4). I am below the range.

My Forecast Low P/E is 17.0. Over the past 10 years, low P/E falls from 25.7 to 18.0 (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 18.7 (excluding the 47.4). I am forecasting near bottom of the range [only ’20 (16.9) and ’23 (16.3) are less].

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) of $177.10 is default based on initial value from above: 34.7% less than previous close and 22.1% less than the 52-week low.

Over the past 10 years, payout ratio (PR) falls from 42.3% to 25.9% (’25) with a last-5-year mean (excluding 89.5% in ’22) of 31.2%. My 25.0% forecast is below the range.

These inputs land CBOE in the HOLD zone with a U/D ratio of 1.0. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 7.1%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) of 3.7% is much lower than I seek for a medium-size company. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors the study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I start by comparing my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on only 19 studies done in the past 90 days (my study and eight outliers excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, Forecast Low P/E, and PR are 7.5%, 8.9%, 27.5, 18.5, and 37.8%, respectively. I am lower across the board. VL projects a future average P/E of 22.5 that is lower than MS (23.0) and greater than mine (21.0).

MS high / low EPS are $18.29 / $11.58 versus my $14.61 / $10.42 (per share). My high EPS is less due to a lower growth rate and initial value. VL (M*) high EPS of $18.00 ($16.18) is in the middle.

MS LSPF of $199.00 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 17.2: less than the above-stated 21.6. MS LSPF is 7.1% less than the default $11.58/share * 18.5 = $214.23 resulting in more conservative zoning. MS LSPF is still 12.4% greater than mine.

MOS is robust in the study mainly because my inputs are near or less than historical/analyst/MS estimates and ranges. Supporting the MOS is MS TAR exceeding mine by 7.4% per year (a bit high although MS sample size really precludes anything but anecdotal comparison) and my lower LSPF.

With regard to valuation, PEG is 1.1 and 2.8 per Zacks and my projected P/E, respectively: fairly valued (0.82 per M*). Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] is slightly depressed at 0.91. “Quick and dirty” cash flow (including capex, which Google AI insists is correct) has stock undervalued by 32%. M* reports stock overvalued by 13%.

Per U/D, CBOE is a BUY under $224/share. Given forecast high price ~$365, [365.1 / ((13.87 / 100 ) +1 ) ^ 5] ~ $191 meets the BetterInvesting® TAR criterion.

A 90-day free trial to BetterInvesting® may be secured here (also see link under “Pages” section at top right of this page).

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RGLD Stock Study (10-3-26)

Posted by on September 3, 2026 at 07:03 | Last modified: October 4, 2026 09:53

I recently studied Royal Gold Inc. (RGLD) with a closing price of $234.64. The previous stock study is here.

M* writes:

     > Royal Gold Inc enquires and manages precious metal royalties and
     > streams, with a focus on gold. The company operates by purchasing
     > a percentage of the metal produced from a mineral property for
     > an initial payment, without assuming responsibility of mining
     > operations. Similarly, precious metal streams are purchase
     > agreements with mine operators providing the right to purchase
     > all or a portion of one or more metals produced from a mine, in
     > exchange for an upfront deposit payment. Generally Royal Gold
     > does not conduct any work on the properties in which it holds
     > royalty and streaming assets. The company owns a portfolio of
     > producing, development, evaluation, and exploration royalties
     > and streams, and the majority of group revenue is generated
     > from Canada, Mexico, Chile, and the United States.

Over the past nine years, this medium-size company has grown sales and EPS at annualized rates of 9.9% and 20.2% [excluding ’18 from the entire study due to EPS loss that Google AI says is “a result of a large impairment charge on its interest in the Pascua-Lama project and tax reform impacts”]. Lines are mostly up and parallel with sales+EPS declines in ’19 and ’22. Five- (10-) year EPS R^2 is 0.45 (0.81) and Value Line (VL) gives an Earnings Predictability score of 75. Shares outstanding increase 6.9% (0.7% per year).

Over the past nine years, PTPM is greater than peer and industry averages while increasing from 27.0% to 55.7% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 52.4%. ROE is roughly even with peers and the industry while increasing from 4.5% to 16.6% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 11.4% (shareholder equity consistently positive and increasing 13.8% per year). Debt-to-Capital is less than peer and industry averages while decreasing from 20.5% to 11.1% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 7.2%.

Quick Ratio is 2.6 and Interest Coverage 19 per M* who assigns a “Narrow” [quantitative] Economic Moat and gives a B grade for Financial Health (per BI website). VL gives an A rating for Financial Strength.

RightStock—a new tool on the BI website that I will be tracking for informational purposes—gives a fitness score of 77 and opportunity score of 92.

With regard to sales growth:

My 16.0% forecast is below the range.

With regard to EPS growth:

My 12.0% per year forecast is below the long-term-estimate range (mean of five: 15.8%). Initial value is ’25 EPS of $6.69/share rather than 2026 Q2 EPS of $9.16 (TTM).

My Forecast High P/E is 30.0. Over the past nine years, high P/E falls from 56.6 to 35.2 (’25) with last-5-year mean of 35.9 and a last-5-year-mean average P/E of 29.2. I am below the range.

My Forecast Low P/E is 22.0. Over the past nine years, low P/E falls from 38.8 to 19.7 (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 22.5. I am forecasting just below the latter.

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) of $147.20 is default based on initial value from above: 37.3% less than previous close and 12.8% less than the 52-week low.

Over the past nine years, payout ratio (PR) falls from 61.3% to 27.3% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 33.4%. My 25.0% forecast is below the range.

These inputs land RGLD in the HOLD zone with a U/D ratio of 1.4. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 9.4%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) of 6.5% is less than I seek for a medium-size company. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors the study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I start by comparing my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 149 studies done in the past 90 days (my study and 47 other outliers excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, Forecast Low P/E, and PR are 16.0%, 15.0%, 30.0, 21.6, and 33.4%, respectively. I am higher on Forecast Low P/E. VL projects a future average P/E of 28.0 that is greater than MS (25.8) and greater than mine (26.0).

MS high / low EPS are $17.92 / $8.65 versus my $11.79 / $6.69 (per share). My high EPS is less due to a lower initial value. VL high EPS of $16.80 is in the middle.

MS LSPF of $171.50 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 19.8: less than the above-stated 21.6. MS LSPF is 8.2% less than the default $8.65/share * 21.6 = $186.84 resulting in more conservative zoning. MS LSPF is still 16.5% greater than mine.

MOS is robust in the study mainly because I am discounting YTD growth. Supporting the MOS is MS TAR exceeding mine by 10.2% per year (too high, really) and my lower LSPF.

With regard to valuation, PEG is 1.8 and 1.9 per Zacks (and M*) and my projected P/E, respectively: fairly valued. Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] is cheap at 0.88. “Quick and dirty” cash flow [including capex, which Google AI insists is correct (quite an interesting deliberation)] has stock undervalued by 52%. M* reports stock overvalued by 17%.

One can make some qualitative arguments to incorporate YTD growth due to the current state of business. 2026 marks the first year of gold deliveries from Kansanshi and production streams from acquired Sandstorm Gold and Horizon Copper portfolios. It’s also the first full year of production from new operations like the Back River (Goose) royalty and Platreef. 2025 EPS includes non-recurring integration costs and transaction fees related to portfolio expansion that all vanish by 2026.

Nevertheless, if RGLD trades back near its 52-week low then all will be clear.

Per U/D, RGLD is a BUY under ~$198/share. Given forecast high price ~$354, [353.7 / ((14.07 / 100 ) +1 ) ^ 5] ~ $183 meets the BetterInvesting® TAR criterion.

A 90-day free trial to BetterInvesting® may be secured here (also see link under “Pages” section at top right of this page).

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NVO Stock Study (10-2-26)

Posted by on August 31, 2026 at 07:13 | Last modified: October 3, 2026 08:08

I recently did a stock study on Novo Nordisk ADR (NVO, $37.40). The previous study is here.

M* writes:

     > With roughly one-third of the global branded diabetes treatment market,
     > Novo Nordisk is the world’s leading provider of diabetes care products.
     > Based in Denmark, the company manufactures and markets a variety of
     > human and modern insulins for patients with diabetes, as well as
     > injectable and oral GLP-1 therapies, across its obesity and diabetes
     > care segment. Novo also has a rare disease segment (contributing less
     > than 10% of revenue) that specializes in protein therapies for
     > hemophilia and other disorders.

Over the past 10 years, this large-size company grows sales and earnings at annualized rates of 12.9% and 14.6%. Lines are mostly up, straight, and parallel except for an EPS dip in ’19. Ten-year earnings R^2 is 0.89 and Value Line (VL) gives an Earnings Predictability score of 90. Shares outstanding decrease 12.3% (1.4%/year).

Over the past 10 years, PTPM leads peer averages but trails the industry while ranging from 39.0% in ’22 to 45.1% in ’23 with a last-5-year mean of 42.4%. ROE leads peer and industry averages despite falling from 96.4% in ’16 to 57.9% in ’25 with an eye-popping last-5-year mean of 75.6% (shareholder equity consistently positive and growing 18.9% per year). Debt-to-capital is less than peer and industry averages despite increasing from 0.5% to 40.3% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 30.6%.

Quick ratio is 0.64 and interest coverage N/A per M* (18.8 per Google AI) who assigns “Wide” Economic Moat and gives a “Standard” rating for Capital Allocation. VL gives an A+ grade for Financial Strength.

RightStock—a new tool on the BI website that I will be tracking for informational purposes—gives a fitness score of 83 and opportunity score of 100.

This is where any hope of “high-quality growth stock” goes out the window for many: just after clearing the barbed wire fence.

With regard to sales growth:

My 1.0% per year forecast is below the range.

With regard to EPS growth:

My 0.5% forecast is near bottom of the long-term-estimate range (mean of eight: 3.5%). Initial value is ’25 EPS of $3.48/share rather than 2026 Q2 EPS of $4.09 (TTM).

My Forecast High P/E is 22.0. Over the past decade, high P/E ranges from 23.1 in ’18 to 39.3 in ’22 (excluding 45.1 in ’24) with last-5-year mean of 35.2 and a last-5-year-mean average P/E of 28.4. I am below the range.

My Forecast Low P/E is 8.0. Over the past decade, low P/E ranges from 12.4 in ’25 to 26.5 in ’22 with a last-5-year mean of 21.6. I am forecasting well below the range.

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) of $27.80 is default based on initial value from above: 25.7% less than previous close and 20.8% less than the 52-week low.

Over the past 10 years, payout ratio (PR) ranges from 37.7% in ’23 to 62.4% in ’16 with a last-5-year mean of 44.4%. My 37.0% forecast is below the range.

These inputs land NVO in the BUY zone with a U/D ratio of 4.3. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 17.7%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) of 9.9% is less than I seek for a large-size company. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors the study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I start by comparing my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 69 studies done in the past 90 days (my study and 31 other outliers excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, Forecast Low P/E, and PR are 3.6%, 4.0%, 25.2, 15.0, and 44.4%, respectively. I am lower across the board. VL projects a future average P/E of 20.5 that is greater than MS (20.1) and greater than mine (15.0).

MS high / low EPS are $4.89 / $3.80 versus my $3.57 / $3.48 (per share). My high EPS is less due to a lower growth rate and initial value. VL (M*) high EPS of $4.50 ($3.97) is in the middle.

MS LSPF of $35.10 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 9.2: less than the above-stated 15.0. MS LSPF is 38.4% less than the default $3.80/share * 15.0 = $57.00 resulting in more conservative zoning. MS LSPF is still 26.3% greater than mine.

MOS is robust in the study because my inputs are near or below historical/analyst/MS estimates and ranges. Supporting the MOS is MS TAR exceeding mine by 7.1% per year and my lower LSPF.

With regard to valuation, PEG is 1.2 and 0.4 per Zacks and M*, respectively: undervalued on average. Relative Value is about lowest I’ve seen at 0.32 [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E]. “Quick and dirty” cash flow [including capex, which Google AI insists is correct (quite an interesting deliberation)] has stock undervalued by 60%. M* reports stock undervalued by 12%.

Per U/D, NVO is a BUY right now under ~$40/share. Given $78.50 forecast high price, [78.5 / ((13.17 / 100 ) +1 ) ^ 5] ~ $42 meets the BetterInvesting® TAR criterion.

I find situations like this quite intriguing: growth discounted to almost zero resulting in a huge MOS while still ending up “buy.” RightStock clearly agrees with the opportunity. The big question is whether the lack of growth will be predictive of a Rule of Five loser (“value trap”).

A 90-day free trial to BetterInvesting® may be secured here (also see link under “Pages” section at top right of this page).

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NVO Stock Study (9-26-25)

Posted by on August 28, 2026 at 07:01 | Last modified: October 2, 2026 12:12

Just over one year ago, I did a stock study on Novo Nordisk ADR (NVO, $56.04). Apparently I never posted it and am therefore doing so now.

M* writes:

     > With roughly one-third of the global branded diabetes treatment market,
     > Novo Nordisk is the world’s leading provider of diabetes care products.
     > Based in Denmark, the company manufactures and markets a variety of
     > human and modern insulins for patients with diabetes, as well as
     > injectable and oral GLP-1 therapies, across its obesity and diabetes
     > care segment. Novo also has a rare disease segment (contributing less
     > than 10% of revenue) that specializes in protein therapies for
     > hemophilia and other disorders.

Over the past decade, this large-size company has grown sales and EPS at annualized rates of 10.4% and 12.7%, respectively. Lines are mostly up, straight, and parallel except for an EPS dip in ’19. Ten-year EPS (sales) R^2 is 0.84 (0.86) and Value Line gives an Earnings Predictability score of 90.

Over the past decade, PTPM is greater than peer and industry averages, ranging from 39.0% (’22) to 45.1% (’23) with a last-5-year mean of 42.4%. ROE is also greater, ranging from 65.7% (’20) to 96.4% (’16) with a last-5-year mean of 77.2%. Debt-to-Capital is also higher than peer and industry averages while increasing from 2.2% (’15) to 41.7% (’24) with a last-5-year mean of 25.4%.

Quick Ratio is only 0.5 but Interest Coverage is 18.3 per M* who assigns a “Wide” Economic Moat and rates the company “Exemplary” for Capital Allocation. [Strangely?] They only give a C grade for Financial Health (per BI website), however. Value Line gives an A rating for Financial Strength.

With regard to sales growth:

My 7.0% per year forecast is below the entire range.

With regard to EPS growth:

My 6.0% forecast is below the long-term-estimate range (mean of seven: 9.8%). I will use ’24 EPS of $3.28/share as the initial value rather than 2025 Q2 EPS of $3.63 (annualized).

My Forecast High P/E is 23.0. Over the past decade, high P/E increases from 30.0 (’15) to 45.1 (’24) with a last-5-year mean of 37.2 and a last-5-year-mean-average P/E of 29.9. I am below the range.

My Forecast Low P/E is 13.0. Over the past decade, low P/E increases from 20.7 (’15) to 24.8 (’24) with a last-5-year mean of 22.7. I am forecasting below the range.

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) of $42.60 is default based on $3.28/share initial value. This is 24.0% less than the previous close and 5.3% less than the 52-week low.

Over the past decade, Payout Ratio ranges from 37.2% (’15) to 62.4% (’16) with a last-5-year mean of 43.9%. I am forecasting below the entire range at 37.0%.

These inputs land NVO in the BUY zone with a U/D ratio of 3.3. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 14.1%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) is slightly lower than I seek for a large company at 9.2%. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors this study, then I can proceed based on the total annualized return (TAR) of 14.1%.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 265 studies (my study and 79 other outliers excluded) over the past 90 days, averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, Forecast Low P/E, and Payout Ratio are 10.4%, 9.5%, 29.4, 19.1, and 43.9%, respectively. I am lower across the board. Value Line’s projected average annual P/E of 24.0 is lower than MS (24.3) but much higher than mine (18.0).

MS high / low EPS are $5.54 / $3.38 versus my $4.39 / $3.28 (per share). My high EPS is lower due to a lower growth rate. Value Line’s high EPS of $4.40 is lower than MS and about equal to mine.

MS Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) of $45.00 implies Forecast Low P/E of 13.3: less than the above-stated 19.1. MS LSPF is 30.3% less than the default $3.38/share * 19.1 = $64.56 resulting in more conservative zoning. MS LSPF is still 5.6% greater than mine.

With regard to valuation, PEG is 2.1 and 2.4 per my projected P/E and Zacks, respectively: slightly overvalued (strangely, M* gives 0.7). Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] is quite cheap at 0.52.

MOS is strong in this study because my inputs are all below respective analyst/historical ranges and MS averages. That is further supported by an MS TAR that is 10.0% per year greater than my 14.1%.

Per U/D, NVO is a BUY under $57.20/share. Given a forecast high of $101, 101 * ((1 – ((15.0 – 1.6) / 100)) ^ 5) ~ $49 meets the BI TAR criterion [doubling in five years].

A 90-day free trial to BetterInvesting® may be secured here (also see link under “Pages” section at top right of this page).

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APH Stock Study (10-1-26)

Posted by on August 25, 2026 at 07:13 | Last modified: October 2, 2026 08:12

I recently did a stock study on Amphenol Corp. (APH, $84.30).

M* writes:

     > Amphenol is a global supplier of connectors, sensors, and
     > interconnect systems. It holds the second-largest connector
     > market share globally and sells into the automotive, broadband,
     > commercial air, industrial, IT and data communications, military,
     > mobile devices, and mobile networks end markets. Amphenol is
     > diversified geographically, with operations in 40 countries.

Over the past 10 years, this large-size company grows sales and earnings at annualized rates of 13.4% and 18.5%. Lines are mostly up, straight, and parallel except for sales dip in ’23 and EPS dips in ’17 and ’19. Five-year earnings R^2 is 0.85 and Value Line (VL) gives an Earnings Predictability score of 80. Shares outstanding increase 1.3% (0.1%/year).

Over the past 10 years, PTPM leads peer and industry averages while increasing from 18.2% to 24.3% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 20.3%. ROE trails peer and industry averages despite increasing from 10.8% to 16.3% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 13.4% (shareholder equity consistently positive and growing 15.5% per year). Debt-to-capital is less than peer and industry averages despite increasing from 45.0% to 53.6% with a last-5-year mean of 42.4%.

Quick ratio is 1.3 and interest coverage 12.6 per M* who assigns “Wide” Economic Moat, gives an “Exemplary” rating for Capital Allocation, and a B grade for Financial Health (per BI website). VL gives an A grade for Financial Strength.

RightStock—a new tool on the BI website that I will be tracking for informational purposes—gives a fitness score of 84 and opportunity score of 68.

With regard to sales growth:

My 17.0% per year forecast is below the range.

With regard to EPS growth:

My 19.0% forecast is below the long-term-estimate range (mean of seven: 25.8%). Initial value is ’25 EPS of $1.67/share rather than 2026 Q2 EPS of $2.00 (TTM).

My Forecast High P/E is 28.0. Over the past decade, high P/E increases from 26.5 to 43.2 (’25) with last-5-year mean of 35.8 and a last-5-year-mean average P/E of 28.7. I am just below the latter.

My Forecast Low P/E is 21.0. Over the past decade, low P/E ranges from 16.1 in ’20 to 24.5 in ’24 (excluding upside outlier of 32.0 in ’17) with a last-5-year mean of 21.6. I am forecasting [aggressively] just below the latter.

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) of $35.10 is default based on initial value from above: 58.4% less than previous close and 40.5% less than the 52-week low.

Over the past 10 years, payout ratio (PR) ranges from 22.3% in ’25 to 34.2% in ’17 with a last-5-year mean of 27.2%. My 22.0% forecast is below the range.

These inputs land APH in the HOLD zone with a U/D ratio of 0.6. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 6.6%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) of 3.9% is less than I seek for a large-size company. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors the study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I start by comparing my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 289 studies done in the past 90 days (my study and 139 other outliers excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, Forecast Low P/E, and PR are 20.0%, 21.9%, 33.8, 21.6, and 27.2%, respectively. I am lower across the board. VL projects a future average P/E of 27.0 that is less than MS (27.7) and greater than mine (24.5).

MS high / low EPS are $6.34 / $2.99 versus my $3.99 / $1.67 (per share). My high EPS is less due to a lower growth rate and initial value (I would argue MS low EPS to be unreasonably high given a much lower 2026 Q2 TTM). VL (and M*) high EPS of $5.40 is in the middle.

MS LSPF of $66.00 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 22.1: greater than the above-stated 21.6. MS LSPF is 2.2% greater than the default $2.99/share * 21.6 = $64.58 resulting in more aggressive zoning. MS LSPF is also 88.0% greater than mine.

MOS is strong in the study because my inputs are near or below historical/analyst/MS EPS averages/ranges. Supporting the MOS is MS TAR exceeding mine by 10.7% per year (unreasonably high but see my note about that $2.99) and my lower LSPF.

With regard to valuation, PEG is 1.2 and 1.9 per Zacks and my projected P/E: fairly valued (M* has 1.5). Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] is extremely high at 1.47. “Quick and dirty” cash flow (including capex, which is debatable) has stock undervalued by 32%. M* reports stock undervalued by 15%.

Per U/D, APH is a BUY under $54/share. Given a forecast high price ~$112, [111.7 / ((14.07 / 100 ) +1 ) ^ 5] ~ $57.50 meets the BetterInvesting® TAR criterion.

A 90-day free trial to BetterInvesting® may be secured here (also see link under “Pages” section at top right of this page).

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ORLY Stock Study (6-29-26)

Posted by on August 20, 2026 at 07:43 | Last modified: June 29, 2026 10:09

I recently did a stock study on O’Reilly Automotive, Inc. (ORLY, $89.55).

M* writes:

     > Founded in 1957, O’Reilly Auto Parts is one of the largest specialty
     > retailers of automotive aftermarket parts, tools, supplies, equipment,
     > and accessories, serving both DIY and professional customers. The
     > company operates nearly 6,600 stores across 48 US states, Puerto Rico,
     > Mexico, and Canada. In fiscal 2025, O’Reilly generated nearly $18 billion
     > in sales, with its dual market strategy yielding a balanced revenue mix,
     > split between retail DIY customers (49%) and professional service
     > orders (49%). The balance of its sales is derived from noncore categories,
     > including wholesale distribution to independent parts distributors,
     > heavy-shop equipment sales, and value-added services.

Over the past 10 years, this large-size company grows sales and earnings at annualized rates of 9.3% and 18.1%. Lines are up, mostly straight, and parallel. Value Line (VL) gives an Earnings Predictability score of 95. Shares outstanding decrease a noticeable 41.0% (5.7%/year).

Over the past 10 years, PTPM leads peer and industry averages while ranging from 17.6% in ’19 to 20.9% in ’21 with a last-5-year mean of 19.1%. ROE is N/A due to triple digit percentages—most recently negative (shareholder equity consistently falling due to heavy stock buybacks and increasing store count). Debt-to-capital is greater than peer and industry averages while increasing from 53.7% to 110% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 116%.

Quick ratio is only 0.1 but interest coverage 14.9 (13.9) per M* (VL) who assigns “Wide” Economic Moat, gives an “Exemplary” rating for Capital Allocation, and an A grade for Financial Health (per BI website). VL gives a B++ grade for Financial Strength.

Negative shareholder equity breaks ROE and makes return on invested capital (ROIC) a better metric due to inclusion of debt along with equity in the denominator. In fact, ORLY is an exceptionally profitable business with a last-5-year mean ROIC over 40%. The company generates strong, consistent cash flows from the automotive aftermarket (per YF as cited by Google AI).

With regard to sales growth:

My 6.0% per year forecast is below the range.

With regard to EPS growth:

My 8.5% forecast is below the long-term-estimate range (mean of eight: 11.5%). Initial value is ’25 EPS of $2.97/share rather than 2026 Q1 EPS of $3.06 (TTM).

My Forecast High P/E is 22.0. Over the past decade, high P/E ranges from 20.7 in ’20 to 36.6 in ’25 with last-5-year mean of 28.6 and a last-5-year-mean average P/E of 24.3. I am near bottom of the range (only ’20 is less).

My Forecast Low P/E is 20.0. Over the past decade, low P/E ranges from 10.7 in ’20 to 26.5 in ’25 with a last-5-year mean of 19.9. I am forecasting [aggressively] just above the latter.

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) of $59.40 is default based on initial value from above: 33.7% less than previous close and 30.0% less than the 52-week low.

These inputs land ORLY in the SELL zone with a U/D ratio of 0.3. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 1.9%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) of 0.9% is unthinkable for an investment candidate. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors the study, then I can proceed based on TAR but even that falls way short of the risk-free rate (T-bills).

To assess MOS, I usually start by comparing my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS) but it’s not even worth doing given the low return numbers just reviewed.

With regard to valuation, PEG is 2.0 and 3.5 per Zacks and my projected P/E: overvalued (M* has 2.5). Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] is expensive at 1.2. “Quick and dirty” cash flow has stock undervalued by 9%. M* (CFRA) reports stock overvalued by 1% (47%).

Visual inspection to me looked encouraging along with a stock trading near its 52-week low. As it turns out, though, it has much farther to cut into recent years’ stock gains before it gets anywhere close to a buy point.

Per U/D, ORLY would be a BUY under $69/share. Given a forecast high price ~$98, the BetterInvesting® TAR criterion would be met [98.3 / ((14.87 / 100 ) +1 ) ^ 5] ~ $49 (no dividend).

A 90-day free trial to BetterInvesting® may be secured here (also see link under “Pages” section at top right of this page).

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MA Stock Study (6-28-26)

Posted by on August 17, 2026 at 07:25 | Last modified: June 28, 2026 10:46

I recently did a stock study on Mastercard Inc. (MA, $499.02).

M* writes:

     > Mastercard is the second-largest payment processor in the
     > world, having processed close to $11 trillion in volume
     > during 2025. Mastercard operates in over 200 countries
     > and processes transactions in over 150 currencies.

Over the past 10 years, this large-size company grows sales and earnings at annualized rates of 12.4% and 18.3%. Lines are up, mostly straight, and parallel except for sales+EPS decline in ’20. Value Line (VL) gives an Earnings Predictability score of 90. Shares outstanding decrease 17.7% (2.1%/year).

Over the past 10 years, PTPM leads peer and industry averages while ranging from 48.2% in ’18 to 57.6% in ’19 with a last-5-year mean of 54.5%. ROE leads peer and industry averages while increasing from 64.1% to 186% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 162.0% (shareholder equity consistently positive with 3.5% CAGR). Debt-to-capital is greater than peer averages but less than the industry while increasing from 47.8% to 71.1% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 69.8%.

Quick ratio is 0.56 and interest coverage 27.7 per M* who assigns “Wide” Economic Moat, gives an “Standard” rating for Capital Allocation, and an A grade for Financial Health (per BI website). VL gives an A+ grade for Financial Strength.

Four references lead Google AI to state:

     > Mastercard’s debt level is generally not concerning, despite
     > appearing high on paper. While the company carries around
     > $18.96 billion in total debt—resulting in a high debt-to-equity
     > ratio—its robust cash generation, massive scale, and exceptional
     > interest coverage make the obligation highly manageable.

With regard to sales growth:

My 9.0% per year forecast is below the range.

With regard to EPS growth:

My 11.0% forecast is below the long-term-estimate range (mean of eight: 15.9%). Initial value is ’25 EPS of $16.52/share rather than 2026 Q3 EPS of $17.28 (TTM).

My Forecast High P/E is 35.0. Over the past decade, high P/E ranges from 29.5 in ’16 to 45.8 in ’21 (excluding 57.7 in ’20) with last-5-year mean of 39.3 and a last-5-year-mean average P/E of 34.6. I am near bottom of the range (only ’16 is less).

My Forecast Low P/E is 22.0. Over the past decade, low P/E increases from 21.3 to 28.2 (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 29.9. I am forecasting near bottom of the range (only ’16 is less).

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) of $363.40 is default based on initial value from above: 27.2% less than previous close and 21.8% less than the 52-week low.

Over the past 10 years, payout ratio (PR) ranges from 16.6% in ’19 to 25.1% in ’20 with a last-5-year mean of 19.2%. My 16.0% forecast is at bottom of the range.

These inputs land MA in the BUY zone with a U/D ratio of 3.5. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 14.8%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) of 10.3% is less than I seek for a large-size company. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors the study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I start by comparing my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 124 studies done in the past 90 days (my study and 42 other outliers excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, Forecast Low P/E, and PR are 13.0%, 14.1%, 35.0, 28.2, and 19.2%, respectively. I am lower (or equal) across the board. VL projects a future average P/E of 30.0 that is less than MS (31.6) and greater than mine (28.5).

MS high / low EPS are $32.97 / $16.42 versus my $27.84 / $16.52 (per share). My high EPS is less due to a lower growth rate. VL (M*) high EPS of $28.90 ($34.19) is in the middle (greater than both).

MS LSPF of $416.50 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 25.4: less than the above-stated 28.2. MS LSPF is 10.1% less than the default $16.42/share * 28.2 = $463.04 resulting in more conservative zoning. MS LSPF is 14.6% greater than mine, though.

MOS is robust in the study because my inputs are near or below historical/analyst/MS averages/ranges. Supporting the MOS is MS TAR exceeding mine by 4.0% per year and my lower LSPF.

With regard to valuation, PEG is 1.6 and 2.4 per Zacks and my projected P/E: overvalued (M* has 1.3). Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] is cheap at 0.84. “Quick and dirty” cash flow (including capex, which is debatable) has stock undervalued by 45%. M* (CFRA) reports stock undervalued (overvalued) by 9% (7%).

Per U/D, MA is a BUY right now under $516/share. [974.4 / ((14.07 / 100 ) +1 ) ^ 5] ~ $504 meets the BetterInvesting® TAR criterion given a forecast high price ~$974.

A 90-day free trial to BetterInvesting® may be secured here (also see link under “Pages” section at top right of this page).

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CTAS Stock Study (6-26-26)

Posted by on August 14, 2026 at 07:15 | Last modified: June 27, 2026 08:35

I recently did a stock study on Cintas Corp. (CTAS, $169.09).

M* writes:

     > Cintas has roots dating back to 1929, when the Farmer family cleaned
     > and resold dirty rags to manufacturing plants in Ohio. The firm has
     > expanded its business organically and through acquisitions, and today
     > Cintas acts as a one-stop outsourcing partner for businesses. Cintas
     > will design, manufacture, collect, and clean every employee uniform
     > for a small weekly sum, taking on the upfront capital expense itself.
     > At the same stop, Cintas can also replace soiled or depleted mats,
     > mops, trash liners, towels, first aid supplies, fire extinguishers, and
     > cleaning products. Businesses value an outsourcing partner like
     > Cintas as it simplifies operations and leaves noncore tasks with
     > high regulatory standards in the hands of professionals.

Over the past 10 years, this large-size company grows sales and earnings at annualized rates of 8.0% and 20.6% (FY ends May 2026). Lines are up, mostly straight, and parallel. Value Line (VL) gives an Earnings Predictability score of 100. Shares outstanding increase 6.7% (0.8%/year).

Over the past 10 years, PTPM leads peer and industry averages while increasing from 14.6% to 21.9% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 19.8%. ROE is even with peer averages while leading the industry and increasing from 21.9% to 38.6% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 35.0% (shareholder equity consistently positive with 10.9% CAGR). Debt-to-capital is less than peer and industry averages while falling from 41.4% to 36.2% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 41.0%.

Quick ratio is 0.95 and interest coverage 24.2 per M* who assigns “Wide” Economic Moat, gives an “Exemplary” rating for Capital Allocation, and an A grade for Financial Health (per BI website). VL gives a A grade for Financial Strength.

With regard to sales growth:

My 7.0% per year forecast is below the range.

With regard to EPS growth:

My 10.0% forecast is below the long-term-estimate range (mean of eight: 11.6%). Initial value is ’25 EPS of $4.40/share rather than 2026 Q3 EPS of $4.74 (TTM).

My Forecast High P/E is 35.0. Over the past decade, high P/E increases from 23.3 to 51.8 (’25) with last-5-year mean of 42.2 and a last-5-year-mean average P/E of 36.1. I am below the last five years.

My Forecast Low P/E is 26.0. Over the past decade, low P/E increases from 19.1 to 38.1 (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 30.0. I am [aggressively] forecasting the lowest since ’20.

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) of $114.40 is default based on initial value from above: 32.3% less than previous close and 29.0% less than the 52-week low.

Over the past 10 years, payout ratio (PR) increases from 25.7% to 35.5% (’25). My 23.0% forecast is at bottom of the range.

These inputs land CTAS in the HOLD zone with a U/D ratio of 1.4. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 8.6%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) of 5.8% is less than I seek for a large-size company. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors the study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I start by comparing my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 85 studies done in the past 90 days (my study and 24 other outliers excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, Forecast Low P/E, and PR are 8.6%, 10.7%, 37.0, 28.0, and 37.3%, respectively. I am lower across the board. VL projects a future average P/E of 30.0 that is less than MS (32.5) and less than mine (30.5).

MS high / low EPS are $7.84 / $4.71 versus my $7.09 / $4.40 (per share). My high EPS is less due to a lower growth rate. VL (M*) high EPS of $7.90 ($7.55) is greater than both (in the middle).

MS LSPF of $130.60 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 27.7: less than the above-stated 28.0. MS LSPF is 1.0% less than the default $4.71/share * 28.0 = $131.88 resulting in more conservative zoning. MS LSPF is 14.2% greater than mine, though.

MOS is moderate in the study because my inputs are near or below some historical/analyst/MS averages/ranges (forecast P/E range is the big exception). Supporting the MOS is MS TAR exceeding mine by 3.5% per year.

With regard to valuation, PEG is 2.7 and 3.2 per Zacks and my projected P/E: overvalued (M* has 2.3). Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] is fair at 1.0. M* reports stock fairly valued while CFRA reports 37% overvalued.

Per U/D, CTAS is a BUY under ~$148/share. Given a forecast high price ~$248, [248.2 / ((14.17 / 100 ) +1 ) ^ 5] ~ $128 would meet the BetterInvesting® TAR criterion.

A 90-day free trial to BetterInvesting® may be secured here (also see link under “Pages” section at top right of this page).

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XP Stock Study (6-24-26)

Posted by on August 11, 2026 at 07:10 | Last modified: June 24, 2026 08:43

I recently did a stock study on XP, Inc. (XP, $15.72).

M* writes:

     > XP Inc is a Cayman Island-based technology-driven
     > financial services platform. It is a provider of low-fee
     > financial products and services in Brazil. The company
     > evaluates its business through a single segment such
     > as monitoring operations, making decisions on fund
     > allocation, and evaluating the performance. It generates
     > revenue through the Brokerage commission. Geographically,
     > the company derives maximum revenue from Brazil and
     > also has its presence in other countries.

Since public trading [as sponsored ADR] begins in 2019, this medium-size company grows sales and earnings at annualized rates of 8.0% and 20.6%. Lines are up, mostly straight, and parallel. Value Line (VL) gives an Earnings Predictability score of 90. Shares outstanding increase 3.9% (0.6%/year).

Since 2019, PTPM leads peer and industry averages while increasing from 42.9% to 68.4% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 63.1%. ROE leads peer and industry averages despite falling from 52.1% to 20.9% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 22.0% (shareholder equity consistently positive with 10.5% CAGR). Debt-to-capital is greater than peer averages and less than the industry while ranging from 66.2% in ’21 to 85.2% in ’24 with a last-5-year mean of 72.8%.

Quick ratio is 0.55 and interest coverage 11.0 per M* who gives an alarming D grade for Financial Health (per BI website). VL gives a B+ grade for Financial Strength and a debt ratio of 0.16, which is generally regarded as very safe (per Google AI).

With regard to sales growth:

My 8.0% per year forecast is below the range.

With regard to EPS growth:

My 10.0% forecast is below the long-term-estimate range (mean of four: 13.6%). Initial value is ’25 EPS of $1.74/share rather than 2026 Q1 EPS of $1.83 (TTM).

My Forecast High P/E is 11.0. Since 2019, high P/E decreases from 75.7 in ’16 to 11.9 (’25) with last-5-year mean of 24.9 and a last-5-year-mean average P/E of 18.1. I am below the range.

My Forecast Low P/E is 6.0. Since 2019, low P/E ranges from 60.0 to 6.2 (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 11.3. I am forecasting below the range.

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) of $10.40 is default based on initial value from above: 33.8% less than previous close and 29.7% less than the 52-week low.

Since dividend inception, payout ratio (PR) is 90.6% in ’23, 48.8% in ’24, and 10.1% in ’25. My conservative forecast is 5.0%.

These inputs land XP in the HOLD zone with a U/D ratio of 2.8. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 14.9%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) of 9.3% is less than I seek for a medium-size company. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors the study, then I can proceed based TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I start by comparing my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on only three other studies done in the past 90 days (too small a sample for anything but anecdotal comparison), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, Forecast Low P/E, and PR are 12.0%, 11.0%, 18.0, 8.1, and 36.6%, respectively. I am lower across the board. VL projects a future average P/E of 14.0 that is greater than MS (13.1) and much greater than mine (8.5).

MS high / low EPS are $3.08 / $1.70 versus my $2.80 / $1.74 (per share). My high EPS is less due to a lower growth rate. VL high EPS of $3.00 is in the middle.

MS LSPF of $10.80 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 6.4: less than the above-stated 8.1. MS LSPF is 21.6% less than the default $1.70/share * 8.1 = $13.77 resulting in more conservative zoning. MS LSPF is still 3.9% greater than mine, though.

MOS is robust in the study because my inputs are near or below historical/analyst/MS averages/ranges. Also supporting this assessment is the lowest TAR of three MS studies exceeding mine by 5.0% per year.

With regard to valuation, PEG is 0.5 and 0.8 per Zacks/M* and my projected P/E: undervalued. Relative Value is quite low at 0.5 [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E]. M* reports stock at a 7% discount.

I hope more in the community study this stock so we can accrue a better understanding of some quirkiness including a D Financial Health grade (with such a low debt ratio?), a 1x cash flow multiplier [per VL, the lowest of three categories its covered stocks fall into is “Low Multiples (4x to 10x cash flow): Applied to slower-growth, highly capital-intensive, or mature businesses.” XP is not capital-intensive; it operates an asset-light, technology-driven business model. It has been around for 25 years but functions as a modernized, high-growth fintech], and MarketWatch’s 2025 stated EPS that is only 18% of 2026.

Per U/D, XP is a BUY under $15.50/share. Given a forecast high price ~$31, [30.8 / ((14.37 / 100 ) +1 ) ^ 5] ~ $15.70 would meet the BetterInvesting® TAR criterion.

A 90-day free trial to BetterInvesting® may be secured here (also see link under “Pages” section at top right of this page).

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ROL Stock Study (6-22-26)

Posted by on August 6, 2026 at 07:46 | Last modified: June 22, 2026 08:15

I recently did a stock study on Rollins, Inc. (ROL, $44.96).

M* writes:

     > Rollins is a global leader in route-based pest control services,
     > with operations primarily in the United States and across North,
     > Central, and South America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa,
     > and Australia. Its portfolio of pest-control brands includes the
     > prominent Orkin brand, a market leader in the US and Canada,
     > with near-national coverage. It also has a portfolio of other
     > brands, which it uses to reach customers through alternative
     > sales channels. Residential pest and termite prevention
     > accounts for the majority of Rollins’ services, reflecting its
     > ongoing focus on the US and Canadian markets.

Over the past decade, this medium-size company grows sales and earnings at annualized rates of 10.4% and 14.6%. Lines are mostly up, straight, and parallel except for a YOY EPS decline in ’19. Value Line (VL) gives an Earnings Predictability score of 90. Shares outstanding decrease 1.4% (0.2%/year).

Over the past decade, PTPM leads peer and industry averages while ranging from 13.0% in ’19 to 19.6% in ’21 with a last-5-year mean of 18.8%. ROE leads peer and industry averages while ranging from 25.1% in ’19 to 39.0% in ’23 with a last-5-year mean of 34.2% (shareholder equity consistently positive with 10.3% CAGR). Debt-to-capital is less than peer and industry averages despite increasing from zero to 43.0% (’25) with a last-5-year mean of 34.1%.

Quick ratio is 0.47 and interest coverage 23.1 per M* who assigns “Wide” Economic Moat, gives “Exemplary” rating for Capital Allocation, and an A grade for Financial Health (per BI website). VL gives a B++ grade for Financial Strength.

With regard to sales growth:

My 6.0% per year forecast is below the range.

With regard to EPS growth:

My 8.0% forecast is below the long-term-estimate range (mean of eight: 11.5%). Initial value is ’25 EPS of $1.09/share.

My Forecast High P/E is 50.0. Over the past 10 years, high P/E ranges from 44.5 in ’16 to 81.1 in ’20 with last-5-year mean of 55.6 and a last-5-year-mean average P/E of 48.0. I am near bottom of the range (only ’16 is less).

My Forecast Low P/E is 30.0. Over the past 10 years, low P/E ranges from 30.8 in ’16 to 50.6 in ’19 with a last-5-year mean of 40.4. I am forecasting below the range.

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) of $32.70 is default based on initial value from above: 27.3% less than previous close and 26.4% less than the 52-week low.

Over the past 10 years, Payout Ratio (PR) ranges from 57.3% in ’22 to 75.7% in ’19 with a last-5-year mean of 60.7%. I am forecasting below the range at 57.0%.

These inputs land ROL in the HOLD zone with a U/D ratio of 2.9. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 13.4%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) of 8.7% is less than I seek for a medium-size company. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors the study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I start by comparing my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 64 studies done in the past 90 days (29 outliers including my study excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, Forecast Low P/E, and PR are 8.8%, 10.6%, 52.1, 39.8, and 59.9%, respectively. I am lower across the board. VL projects a future average P/E of 45.0 that is less than MS (46.0) and greater than mine (40.0).

MS high / low EPS are $1.81 / $1.08 versus my $1.60 / $1.09 (per share). My high EPS is less due to a lower growth rate. VL (M*) high EPS of $1.70 ($1.84) is in the middle (greater than both).

MS LSPF of $42.10 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 39.0: less than the above-stated 39.8. MS LSPF is 2.1% less than the default $1.08/share * 39.8 = $42.98 resulting in more conservative zoning. MS LSPF is 28.8% greater than mine, though.

MOS is robust in the study because my inputs are near or below most historical/analyst/MS averages/ranges. MS TAR exceeding mine by 1.1% per year (per BI website†) and my substantially lower LSPF support the assessment.

With regard to valuation, PEG is 2.8 and 4.8 per Zacks and my projected P/E: quite overvalued (M* has 3.4 for ’25). Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] is fair at 0.9. “Quick and Dirty” free cash flow method has stock undervalued by 41% (factoring in capex, which is debatable). M* reports stock at an 11% discount.

Per U/D, ROL is a BUY under $44/share. Given a forecast high price $80, [80.0 / ((13.77 / 100 ) +1 ) ^ 5] ~ $42 would meet the BetterInvesting® TAR criterion.

A 90-day free trial to BetterInvesting® may be secured here (also see link under “Pages” section at top right of this page).

† — I think this is wrong. Google AI reports CAGR difference (excluding dividend) is 3.6%.

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