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ADUS Stock Study (5-29-23)

I recently did a stock study on Addus Homecare Corp. (ADUS) with a closing price of $88.81.

M* writes:

     > Addus HomeCare Corp is engaged in the provision of in-home personal
     > care services. It operates through the following segments: Personal
     > care segment, which is a key revenue driver, provides nonmedical
     > assistance with activities of daily living, primarily to persons who
     > are at risk of hospitalization or institutionalization, such as the
     > elderly, chronically ill and disabled. The Hospice segment provides
     > physical, emotional and spiritual care for people who are terminally
     > ill and their families. Its Home health segment provides services
     > that are primarily medical in nature to those individuals who may
     > require assistance during an illness or after surgery.

Over the last decade, this small-size company has grown sales and EPS at annualized rates of 15.9% and 13.8%, respectively. Lines are mostly up, straight, and parallel except for EPS dip in ’15. PTPM has been up and down—leading peers but trailing the industry—with a last-5-year average of 5.6%.

Over the last decade, ROE has led peer and industry averages despite trending down from 9.8% to 7.5% with a last-5-year average of 7.0%. Debt-to-Capital is much lower than peer and industry averages with a last-5-year average of 21.1%. Quick Ratio is 1.6 and Interest Coverage is 7.8 per M*. Value Line rates the company B+ for Financial Strength.

I forecast long-term sales growth of 6.0% based on the following:

I am forecasting conservatively.

I forecast long-term annualized EPS growth of 11.0% based on the following:

I am forecasting below the long-term-estimate range (mean of five: 13.9%). I am using ’22 EPS of $2.84/share as the initial value rather than Q1 ’23 EPS of $3.10 (annualized).

My Forecast High P/E is 36. Over the last 10 years, high P/E has ranged from 27.3 in ’14 to 56.7 in ’20 with a last-5-year average of 50.4. The last-5-year-average average P/E is 37.9. I am forecasting below that.

My Forecast Low P/E is 22. Over the last 10 years, low P/E has ranged from 7.0 in ’13 to 32.0 in ’19 with a last-5-year average of 25.4. I am forecasting just below the median (22.4).

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) is the default value of $62.50 (based on initial EPS of $2.84/share). This is 29.6% less than the previous close and 8.9% less than the ’22 low.

These inputs land ADUS in the BUY zone with an U/D ratio of 3.2. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 14.2%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) is 9.3%, which is less than I seek for a small-size company. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors this study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 158 studies over the past 90 days (my study and 52 outliers excluded), averages for projected sales growth, EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, and Forecast Low P/E are 9.7%, 13.0%, 39.2, and 24.9, respectively. I am lower across the board.

MS high and low EPS are $5.40/share and $2.85/share in contrast to my $4.79 and $2.84. My high EPS is probably lower due to a lower growth rate.

MS LSPF of $70.70 is consistent with the $2.85 * 24.9 = $70.97 default value. It’s also 13.1% greater than mine, which along with my lower inputs lend support for a robust MOS behind the current study.

PEG ratio is another value check I am just starting to monitor. My forward PEG is 29 / 11 = 2.6. A generally-accepted upper limit is 1.0 – 1.5, but it’s also good to compare against the industry average [which I don’t have].

ADUS shares are a BUY under $89.

ALGN Stock Study (5-11-23)

I recently did a stock study on Align Technology Inc. (ALGN) with a closing price of $305.26.

CFRA writes:

     > Align Technology, Inc. (ALGN) is a global medical device company
     > engaged in the design, manufacture, and marketing of Invisalign
     > clear aligners and iTero intraoral scanners and services for
     > orthodontics, and restorative and aesthetic dentistry. ALGN
     > also provides exocad computer-aided design and computer-aided
     > manufacturing (“CAD/CAM”) software for dental laboratories and
     > dental practitioners. ALGN’s products are intended primarily
     > for the treatment of malocclusion or the misalignment of teeth.

This medium-size company has posted annualized growth of 23.8% and 25.0% for sales and EPS (excluding ’20, which is an upside outlier that boosts the latter growth rate to 30.3%), respectively, over the last 10 years. Lines are mostly up, straight, and parallel except for a spike in ’20 EPS and ’22 EPS, which drops off considerably. PTPM has mostly led the industry while falling behind peers in ’19 with a last-5-year average of 20.8%.

ROE leads peer and industry averages with a last-5-year average (excluding ’20) of 24.4%. The same holds for Debt-to-Capital with a last-5-year average of 2.7% (per Value Line, the company has no long-term debt). Value Line gives ALGN a Financial Strength rating of B++ and M* a Standard rating for Capital Allocation.

I forecast long-term annualized sales growth of 6% based on the following:

I am forecasting conservatively.

I forecast long-term annualized EPS growth of 10% based on the following:

As CFRA recuses itself from that longer-term estimate, I believe YF’s long-term estimate to also be NMF as an extreme outlier. I am forecasting conservatively below the long-term-estimate range (mean of five: 17.0%).

An initial value discussion awaits since EPS numbers are discrepant. The ’22 10-K shows a drop from $9.69/share in ’21 to $4.61/share in ’22 (d52.4%). Value Line, however, shows a drop from $9.79/share in ’21 to $7.22/share in ’22 (d26.3%) without footnoting any nonrecurring losses. CFRA shows a drop in normalized EPS from $11.22/share in ’21 to $7.76/share in ’22 (d30.8%) without giving any explanation as to what is being omitted.

And suddenly, YF’s 43.3% doesn’t look so outrageous if done from ’23 Q1 EPS ($4.05/share annualized) because $24.47 in ’27 is about even with the extrapolated trendline (with ’20 EPS of $22.41/share excluded).

For lack of any better idea and a need to maintain a minimum high EPS for a valid study, I am forecasting 10% EPS growth. As mentioned above, this is below the long-term-estimate range. I will project from the trendline, however, rather than the last quarterly or annual EPS. Furthermore, I will exclude ’21 EPS. This lowers the ’22 trendline from $8.69/share to $7.37/share.

My Forecast High P/E is 30. Over the last 10 years, high P/E ranges from 24.3 (’20) to 142 (upside outlier in ’22) with a last-5-year average of 60.5. Excluding ’20 as a downside outlier, the next-lowest value is 36.8 (’14). I am forecasting conservatively.

My Forecast Low P/E is 24. Over the last 10 years, low P/E ranges from 5.7 in ’20 to 51 in ’21. I would exclude both as outliers. The last-5-year average is then 35.5. The second-lowest P/E is 24.4 in ’14. I am forecasting just below the latter.

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) is $176.90. Zero growth is assumed beyond the $7.37/share derived above. This is 42.0% below the previous close and 2.8% above the 52-week low.

These inputs land ALGN in the HOLD zone with an U/D ratio of 0.9. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 7.0%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) is 3.1%, which is less than the current risk-free rate. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors this study, then I can proceed based on the 7.0% instead.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 132 studies done in the past 90 days (my study along with 29 outliers excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, and Forecast Low P/E, are 13.3%, 15.0%, 47.9, and 28.7. Despite being lower on all inputs, my EPS override makes comparison difficult. Value Line projects a future average annual P/E of 26.5, which is much lower than MS (38.3) and lower than mine (30.0). The former is ~50% greater than Value Line, which makes me wonder if other studies were as confused about this company as I am.

With regard to other data, MS high and low EPS are $8.53/share and $4.55/share in contrast to my $11.87 and $7.37. MS LSPF of $141.90 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 31.2 (versus the above-stated 28.7), is 19.8% less than mine, and is 8.7% greater than the $4.55 * 28.7 = $130.59 default.

At first, this encounter with ALGN was much easier than my original 11/8/22 stock study because the negative analyst forecasts have now turned positive thereby facilitating the math. Ultimately though, this study proved to be every bit as much of a challenge due to confusion about what different sources are excluding and why.

The stock has rallied 77.4% from [what is currently] the 52-week low. I wouldn’t expect any stock that has rallied this much to be near the BUY zone, and this certainly is not. I would look to re-evaluate under $240/share.

BKNG Stock Study (5-10-23)

I recently did a stock study on Booking Holdings Inc. (BKNG) with a closing price of $2,634.91.

M* writes:

     > Booking is the world’s largest online travel agency by revenue,
     > offering booking and payment services for hotel and alternative
     > accommodation rooms, airline tickets, rental cars, restaurant
     > reservations, cruises, experiences, and other vacation packages.
     > The company operates a number of branded travel booking sites,
     > including Booking.com, Agoda, OpenTable, and Rentalcars.com,
     > and has expanded into travel media with the acquisitions of
     > Kayak and Momondo. Transaction fees for online bookings account
     > for the bulk of revenue and profits.

This large-size company has grown sales and EPS at annualized rates of 7.2% and 4.9%, respectively, over the last decade (’20 excluded due to COVID-19). Lines are mostly up, straight, and parallel with the exception of slight EPS softness in ’16-’17 (goodwill impairment charge with EPS subsequently catching back up to previous trendline in ’18) and ’21 (lower sales and EPS followed by healthy rebound in ’22). PTPM has been higher than peers and the industry with a last-5-year average of 23.5% (no exclusions). Also higher than peers and the industry is ROE with a last-5-year average of 43.8%.

For most of the last 10 years, Debt-to-Capital has been lower than industry averages while roughly equal to peers. The last-5-year average is 65.8%. Current and Quick Ratios are ~1.5 and Interest Coverage is 10.8 per M*. M* also rates Capital Allocation as Exemplary given that the $6.3B debt to mature within the next five years is much less than the projected $30B+ FCF over the same period. Value Line gives a B++ grade for Financial Strength.

I forecast long-term annualized sales growth of 5% based on the following:

I am forecasting just below Value Line’s long-term estimate (includes zero growth from ’24-’27, which seems good for a conservative projection but puzzling otherwise).

I forecast long-term annualized EPS growth of 15% based on the following:

I am forecasting below the long-term-estimate range (mean of six: 20.0%).

My Forecast High P/E is 20. Excluding upside outliers of 1547 in ’20 and 95.4 in ’21, over the last 10 years high P/E has ranged from 18.6 in ’19 to 44.1 in ’17 with a last-5-year average of 27.0. Only ’19 is lower than my [conservative] forecast.

My Forecast Low P/E is 15. Excluding upside outliers of 769 in ’20 and 66.1 in ’21, over the last 10 years low P/E has ranged from 14.6 in ’19 to 31.1 in ’17 with a last-5-year average of 18.4. Only ’19 is lower than my [conservative] forecast.

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) is the default value of $1,529.50. This is 42.0% less than the previous close and 5.4% less than the 52-week low.

These inputs land BKNG in the HOLD zone with an U/D ratio of 1.3. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 9.3%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) is 6.4%, which is less than I want to see. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors this study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 149 studies done in the past 90 days (my study along with 19 outliers excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, and Forecast Low P/E, are 11.6%, 14.5%, 29.7, and 20.0. I am lower on all inputs but EPS growth (15.0%). Value Line projects a future average annual P/E of 20.0, which is lower than MS (24.9) and higher than mine (17.5).

With regard to other data, MS high and low EPS are $150.63/share and $66.18/share compared to my $205.10 and $101.97. ’22 EPS of $76.35 at least partially explains this as a much lower initial value for projection than the $101.97/share for Q1 ’23. MS LSPF of $1,395.40 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 21.1 (versus the above-stated 20.0), is 8.8% lower than mine, and is 5.4% higher [more aggressive] than the $66.18 * 20.0 = $1,323.60 default.

I don’t see much MOS behind this study and in retrospect, I would do two things differently. First, as recovery from COVID-19 is underway but not complete, analyst estimates may remain elevated (catch-up to trendline). [As noted above] Value Line long-term EPS estimate starting in ’23 compared to ’22 suggests an EPS growth rate of 12% rather than 15%. Second, Q1 ’23 EPS (annualized) is much greater than ’22. As a conservative measure when I see such leap, I could use the previous (lower) value. These modifications would boost MOS behind this study at the cost of leaving the stock even farther from the BUY zone. Either way, with BKNG up ~35% in the last six months it’s not one I should expect to be near the BUY zone anyway.

I would look to re-evaluate the stock under $2,170/share.

GOOG Stock Study (5-9-23)

I recently did a stock study on Alphabet, Inc. (GOOG) with a closing price of $108.24. A previous study on this company can be seen here.

M* writes:

     > Alphabet is a holding company. Internet media giant
     > Google is a wholly owned subsidiary. Google generates
     > 99% of Alphabet revenue, of which more than 85% is
     > from online ads. Google’s other revenue is from sales
     > of apps and content on Google Play and YouTube, as
     > well as cloud service fees and other licensing
     > revenue. Sales of hardware such as Chromebooks, the
     > Pixel smartphone, and smart home products, which
     > include Nest and Google Home, also contribute to other
     > revenue. Alphabet’s moonshot investments are in its
     > other bets segment, where it bets on technology to
     > enhance health (Verily), faster internet access to homes
     > (Google Fiber), self-driving cars (Waymo), and more.

This mega-sized (revenue > $50B) company has grown sales and EPS at annualized rates of 19.2% and 13.2% per year, respectively, for the last decade. Revenue is up and straight while earnings from 2013 did not show growth until 2018 and beyond. Excluding ’21, which was an upside outlier, PTPM has averaged 25.2% for the last five years, is steady over the last 10, but has solidly trailed peer and industry averages.

Over the last five years, ROE averages 18.4% while trailing peer and industry averages. Debt-to-Capital, under 11% for the last decade, averages 6.6% for the last five years and is lower than peer and industry averages. Interest Coverage and Quick Ratio are 200 and 2.2 while M* and Value Line give Exemplary and A++ grades for Capital Allocation and Financial Strength.

I forecast long-term annualized sales growth of 8% based on the following:

I am projecting below the two long-term estimates.

I forecast long-term annualized EPS growth of 11% based on the following:

I am forecasting below the long-term-estimate range (mean of six: 15.3%).

My Forecast High P/E is 25. High P/E has ranged from 27.1 (’21) to 34.1 (’15) since 2014 with a 5-year average of 28.9. The trend has been down. I am forecasting below the range.

My Forecast Low P/E is 15. Low P/E has trended down from 24.0 in ’14 to 15.1 in ’21 with a last-5-year average (excluding the ’17 upside outlier of 42.9) of 18.8. I am forecasting below the entire range.

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) is $70.60, which is default given the most recent EPS (at $5.04/share, Q3 ’22 is the third straight quarter in decline). This is 34.8% less than the previous close and 15.4% less than the 52-week low.

These inputs land GOOG in the HOLD zone with an U/D ratio of 2.8. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 14.4%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) is 8.9%, which is less than I want to see. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors this study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 674 studies done in the past 90 days (my study along with 84 outliers excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, and Forecast Low P/E, are 10.0%, 13.2%, 27.2, and 18.6. I am lower across the board. Value Line projects a future average annual P/E of 25.0, which is higher than MS (22.9) and much higher than mine (20.0). MOS backing the current study seems robust.

With regard to other data, MS high and low EPS are $8.53/share and $4.55/share compared to my $8.49 and $5.04. I am surprised the former is not even greater than mine given a 2.2% higher MS projected growth rate. I’m not exactly sure where the $4.55 comes from, either. By default, earlier studies should use a low EPS equal to or higher (Q2 ’22: $5.38/share) than mine. MS LSPF of $79.30 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 17.4 (versus the above-stated 18.6), is 12.3% higher than mine, and is 6.3% lower than the $4.55 * 18.6 = $84.63 default.

I would look to buy GOOG under $106/share.

G Stock Study (5-24-23)

I recently did a stock study on Genpact Ltd. (G) with a closing price of $38.13.

M* writes:

     > Genpact Ltd is a provider of business process management services.
     > Clients are industry verticals and operate in banking and
     > financial services, insurance, capital markets, consumer product
     > goods, life sciences, infrastructure, manufacturing and services,
     > healthcare, and high-tech. Genpact’s services include aftermarket,
     > procurement, risk and compliance, human resources, IT, industrial
     > direct solutions, collections, finance and accounting, and media
     > services. Genpact’s end market by revenue is India. The company
     > is a General Electric spin-off, which is still a large source of
     > revenue for Genpact.

This medium-size company has grown sales and EPS at annualized rates of 8.5% and 8.9% over the last decade. Lines are mostly up, straight, and parallel except for EPS dips in ’14 and ’22. PTPM has remained above peer and industry averages, declining from 14.4% in ’13 to 10.6% in ’22 with a last-5-year average of 11.4%.

Over the last 10 years, ROE slightly trails the industry while beating peer averages with a last-5-year mean of 18.9%. Debt-to-Capital is lower than industry averages and about even with peers despite climbing from 33.4% in ’13 to 48.2% in ’22 with a last-5-year mean of 50.3%. Quick Ratio is 1.7 and Interest Coverage is 9.2. Value Line rates the company B++ for Financial Strength and CFRA describes the balance sheet as “clean, with a low net debt-to-EBITDA ratio of 1.4x on a TTM basis.”

I forecast long-term sales growth of 7.0% based on the following:

I am forecasting just below the long-term estimate.

I forecast long-term annualized EPS growth of 8.0% based on the following:

I am forecasting below the long-term-estimate range (mean of five: 9.6%). My initial value is the ’22 EPS of $1.88/share rather than Q1 ’23 EPS of $1.94 (annualized).

My Forecast High P/E is 22. Over the last 10 years, high P/E has trended up from 22.0 in ’13 to 28.7 in ’22 with a last-5-year average of 27.7. I am forecasting conservatively at the bottom of the range. The last-5-year-average average P/E is 22.5.

My Forecast Low P/E is 15. Aside from ’20 (downside outlier at 12.4), low P/E over the last 10 years has trended up from 15.8 in ’13 to 20.0 in ’22 with a last-5-year average of 18.6 (outlier excluded). I am forecasting conservatively below the range.

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) is the default [using $1.88/share] value of $28.20. This is 26.0% less than the previous closing price and 21.2% less than the 52-week low.

Since dividend payment was instituted, Payout Ratio has increased from 17.9% in ’17 to 26.6% in ’22 with a last-5-year average of 23.3%. I am forecasting near the bottom of the range at 18.0%.

These inputs land G in the HOLD zone with an U/D ratio of 2.3. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 10.6%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) is 7.0%, which is less than I seek for a medium-size company. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors this study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on only 27 studies (my study and 12 outliers excluded) over the past 90 days, averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, Forecast Low P/E, and Payout Ratio are 8.0%, 10.0%, 25.3, 16.6, and 21.3%. I am lower across the board. Value Line’s projected average annual P/E of 17.0 is lower than MS (21.0) and mine (18.5).

With regard to EPS, MS high and low are $3.04/share and $1.83/share in contrast to my $2.76 and $1.88. My high EPS is lower due to forecast EPS growth rate.

MS Low Stock Price Forecast of $30.20 is 7.1% greater than mine and in-line with the $1.83 * 16.6 = $30.38 default value.

MOS in this study seems consistent. Come to think of it, everything about this study has been “consistent.” Maybe that’s something to expect for a company with an Earnings Predictability rating (Value Line) of 100.

G is a BUY under $36/share.

GPN Stock Study (5-8-23)

I recently did a stock study on Global Payments Inc. (GPN) with a closing price of $104.78. A previous study on this company was done here.

CFRA writes:

     > Global Payments (GPN) provides payment processing and software
     > solutions globally through a variety of distribution channels,
     > which enable customers to accept card, electronic, check, and
     > digital-based payments. Specific offerings include
     > authorization, settlement, funding, customer support,
     > chargeback, security, and billing services.

This medium-size company has grown sales and earnings at annualized rates of 16.2% and 8.6% over the last nine and eight years, respectively. The latter excludes ’22 whose EPS was materially impacted by a goodwill impairment. Per the 2022 10-K:

     > A sustained decline in our share price and increases in discount
     > rates, primarily resulting from increased economic uncertainty,
     > indicated a potential decline in fair value and triggered a
     > requirement to evaluate our Issuer Solutions and our former
     > Business and Consumer Solutions reporting units for potential
     > impairment as of June 30, 2022… Based on the quantitative
     > assessment of our former Business and Consumer Solutions
     > reporting unit, including consideration of the consumer business
     > disposal group and the remaining assets of the reporting unit,
     > we recognized a goodwill impairment charge of $833.1 million
     > in our consolidated statement of income during the three
     > months ended June 30, 2022.

This company probably does not clear the barbed wire fence (visual inspection), which may explain why so few studies have been done. Revenue data is [missing for ’16 and] down in ’18 while EPS is [missing for ’16 and] down in ’15, ’18, ’19, and ’20. [Stock] Price bars in ’17 and ’23 overlap, which represents several years without significant appreciation.

Pressing on regardless, PTPM has been higher than peers and the industry by averaging 10.0% over the last five years (including 2.5% for ’22).

ROE has averaged 4.0% over the last five years. Since ’13, ROE has been mostly higher than peer and industry averages. Debt-to-Capital has fallen from 64.8% in ’13 to 39.0% in ’22 with a last-5-year average of 36.5%. This is lower than peer and industry averages since ’19. Quick Ratio and Interest Coverage are a concerning 0.50 and 0.76, respectively.

Whether or not it should, the fact that so many analysts are covering this company gives me some reassurance about liquidity. Aside from all the analysts included in consensus estimates shown below, M* says the balance sheet is sound and gives a Standard rating for Capital Allocation. Value Line gives a B++ rating for Financial Strength and says GPN “should continue to meet its various obligations with minimal difficulty.”

I forecast long-term annualized sales growth of 7% based on the following:

I am forecasting below the long-term estimates.

I forecast long-term annualized EPS growth of 12% based on the following:

I am forecasting below the long-term-estimate range (mean of six: 14.7%).

Because ’22 GAAP EPS of $0.40 is NMF as an initial value, I will project from the ’22 trendline at $2.93/share. This is more conservative (lower) than ’21 EPS of $3.29/share.

My Forecast High P/E is 30. Over the last 10 years, high P/E has trended up from 21.9 in ’13 to 67.1 in ’21 with what I suspect are surrounding NMF (i.e. 85.8, 111, and 384 in ’19, ’20, and ’22). I am forecasting at the upper end of my comfort zone, which is the lowest high P/E since ’14 (25.7).

My Forecast Low P/E is 25. Over the last 10 years, low P/E has trended up from 13.3 in ’13 to 54.1 in ’20 with what I suspect are surrounding NMF (i.e. 45.6, 54.1, and 231 in ’19, ’20, and ’22). My forecast is the lowest low P/E since ’17 (22.9).

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) is $73.30, which is default given the low EPS value mentioned above of $2.93/share. This is 30.0% less than the previous close and 20.6% less than the 52-week low.

Payout Ratio was below 3.0% through ’18 before averaging 25.8% from ’19-’21 (’22 is NMF). I am forecasting low at 10.0%.

These inputs land GPN in the HOLD zone with an U/D ratio of 1.6. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 8.5%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) is 6.7%, which is less than I seek for a medium-size company. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors this study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on only 46 studies done in the past 90 days (my study along with 24 outliers excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, Forecast Low P/E, and Payout Ratio are 9.0%, 13.0%, 40.2, 28.2, and 12.7%. I am lower across the board. Value Line projects a future average annual P/E of 26.5, which is lower than MS (34.2) and just lower than mine (27.5). MOS backing the current study seems moderate.

With regard to other data, MS high and low EPS are $2.02/share (median $0.90) and $1.74/share compared to my $5.17 and $2.93. MS standard deviation is quite large at $1.92 and $1.39, respectively. Along with the small sample size and discrepant mean/median high EPS, this may reflect confusion about how to handle the GAAP EPS. Furthermore, 20 out of 46 studies have low EPS $0.39 or less, which I would argue to be unreasonable. The MS LSPF of $68.90 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 39.6 (versus the above-stated 28.2) and is 28.8% higher than the $1.74 * 28.2 = $49.07 default. Despite being 6.0% lower than mine, this is rather aggressive forecast with regard to valuation.

I would look to re-evaluate GPN under $93/share as a speculative (smaller) holding due mainly to poor visual inspection and questionable liquidity ratios (also a sign that this analyst may not fully understand the business).

MBUU Stock Study (5-1-23)

I recently did a stock study on Malibu Boats Inc. (MBUU) with a closing price of $56.75.

M* writes:

     > Malibu Boats is a leading designer and manufacturer of power
     > boats in the United States. It is the market leader in
     > performance sport boats, sold under its Malibu and Axis brands.
     > It acquired Cobalt Boats, a leading producer of sterndrive
     > boats in the U.S. in the 24-foot to 29-foot segment, and
     > Pursuit Boats, which makes high-end offshore and outboard
     > motorboats in 2018. In 2021, it purchased Maverick Boat Group,
     > a leading seller of flat fishing boats, with exposure to bay,
     > dual-console, and center-console boats. Malibu has also
     > expanded into boat trailers and accessories, and in 2020
     > began producing its own engines (Monsoon) for its performance
     > sport boats. Malibu’s target market includes a wide range of
     > water enthusiasts who embrace active lifestyles.

Over the last 10 years, this medium-size (as of 2022) company has grown sales and earnings at annualized rates of 25.7% and 33.6% (75.6% if ’14 is included when the company posted a loss), respectively. Lines are mostly up, straight, and parallel except for sales decline in ’20 and EPS declines in ’14, ’18, and ’20. PTPM over the decade is higher than peer and industry averages and has increased from 10.8% in ’13 to 17.3% in ’22. The last-5-year average is 15.5%.

ROE over the last five years is slightly better than peer and industry averages—ranging from 22.9% (’18) to 35.6% (’19) with a mean of 29.9%. Debt-to-Capital is slightly lower than peer and industry averages—declining from 152% in ’15 to 19.5% in ’22 with a last-5-year average of 30.6%. Interest Coverage is 62 and Quick Ratio is 0.8. M* rates the company Standard for Capital Allocation while Value Line assigns a B++ rating for Financial Strength.

I forecast long-term annualized sales growth of 6% based on the following:

I am forecasting less than both long-term estimates.

I forecast long-term annualized EPS growth of 4% based on the following:

I am forecasting toward the bottom of the long-term range (mean of 4 estimates: 9.6%). Despite the first two quarters of growth for ’23 ending with $8.23/share, I am projecting from the last annual EPS ($7.51/share).

My Forecast High P/E is 13. Excluding the upside outlier in ’18 (34.2), high P/E has trended down from 26.0 (’15) to 11.5 (’22) with a last-5-year average of 16.9. I am forecasting toward the bottom of the range (only ’22 value is lower).

My Forecast Low P/E is 5. From ’15 to ’22, low P/E has trended down from 17.4 to 6.4 with a last-5-year average of 10.0. I am projecting below the entire range and [as mentioned above] using ’22 EPS of $7.51 rather than Q2 2023.

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) is the default value of $37.50. This is 33.4% less than the previous close and 19.0% less than the 52-week low.

These inputs land MBUU in the BUY zone with an U/D ratio of 3.2. The Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 15.9%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) is 7.7%, which is a bit lower than I would like for a medium-size company. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors this study, then I can proceed based on the TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 233 studies done in the past 90 days (62 outliers and my study excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, and Forecast Low P/E are 8.5%, 10.0%, 14.8, and 7.8. I am lower across the board. Value Line projects a future average annual P/E of 10.0, which is lower than MS (11.3) and higher than me (9.0).

With regard to other data, MS high and low EPS are $12.66/share and $7.59/share compared to my $9.14 and $7.51. My high EPS is lower due to a lower forecast growth rate and my low EPS would be higher had I included the most recent quarters of growth [not doing so bolsters MOS]. MS LSPF is $45.80, which is 22.1% higher than mine and much lower than the default value of $7.59 * 7.8 = $59.20. MOS seems robust in the current study.

I would look to sail away with shares under $57.00.

As a housekeeping note, this was my second consecutive quarter studying MBUU. Quarterly reviews will become commonplace for many stocks. No changes had to be made for anything in the history, corporate description, or Forecast High/Low P/E sections. This will probably be the case most of the time unless the current study begins a new FY. In that case, a new annual data point may replace the oldest in the 10-year range thereby creating a new distribution.

YETI Stock Study (5-22-23)

I recently did a stock study on YETI Holdings (YETI) with a closing price of $39.33.

M* writes:

     > YETI Holdings Inc is a designer, marketer, and distributor of premium
     > products for the outdoor and recreation market sold under the YETI
     > brand. The company offers products including coolers and equipment,
     > drinkware, and other accessories. Its trademark products include YETI,
     > Tundra, Hopper, YETI TANK, Rambler, Colster, Rambler Colster, Roadie,
     > and Wildly Stronger! Keep Ice Longer!, SideKick, FatWall, PermaFrost,
     > T-Rex, ColdLock, NeverFail, AnchorPoint, InterLock, BearFoot, Vortex,
     > DoubleHaul, LipGrip, Vortex, DryHide, ColdCell, HydroLock, Over-the-
     > Nose, and LOAD-AND-LOCK. The company distributes products through
     > wholesale channels and through direct-to-consumer, or DTC, channels.

This medium-size company has grown sales and earnings at annualized rates of 32.5% and 19.3% over the last 9 and 7 years, respectively [’13-’14 EPS excluded due to small fractional values that artificially inflate the growth rate]. The visual inspection is mediocre. Sales are up and straight except for spike in ’15 and decline in ’17. EPS are down in ’16, ’17, ’19, and ’22 [I will exclude the latter 57.1% YOY decline due to operational snafus including recall of defective items and inflation-induced demand destruction per Value Line]. PTPM has led peer and industry averages with a last-5-year average of 12.3%.

ROE has averaged 47.6% over the last four years (too brief a history to compare peer and industry averages). Debt-to-Capital has been declining since ’16 and fell below than peer and industry averages in ’20 with a last-5-year average of 50.9% [23.8% in ’22]. Interest coverage is 23.7 and quick ratio is 0.80. Value Line rates the company B+ for Financial Strength.

I forecast long-term sales growth of 7% based on the following:

I am forecasting conservatively below the long-term estimate.

I forecast long-term annualized EPS growth of 8% based on the following:

I am forecasting below the long-term-estimate range (mean of six: 11.3%). I am also projecting from the trendline ($1.90/share) rather than ’22 EPS of $1.03/share or Q1 ’23 EPS of $0.85/share (annualized). I would have otherwise projected from the ’20 EPS [rather than the ’21 $2.40/share due to its 33% YOY spike] of $1.77/share [close to the ’22 trendline at $1.90] and projected forward seven years [rather than five]. The trendline works out well.

My Forecast High P/E is 31. With the stock trading publicly since ’18, high P/E has increased since the first year’s 31.1 for a last-5-year average of 53.0. The last-5-year-average average P/E is 36.9. I am forecasting below the range.

My Forecast Low P/E is 14. Over the last five years, low P/E has ranged from 8.6 (perhaps a downside outlier) in ’20 to 27.0 in ’22 with a last-5-year average of 20.8. I am forecasting conservatively (18.0 in ’18 being the second-lowest value).

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) is the default [using $1.90/share] value of $26.60. This is 32.4% less than the previous close and 4.7% less than the 52-week low.

These inputs land YETI in the BUY zone with an U/D ratio of 3.7. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 17.1%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) is 9.8%, which is less than I seek for a medium-size company. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors this study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 72 studies done in the past 90 days (my study and 15 outliers excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, and Forecast Low P/E are 10.0%, 14.5%, 31.6, and 18.7. I am lower across the board. Value Line’s future average annual P/E of 20.0 is lower than both MS (25.2) and mine (22.5).

With regard to EPS, MS high and low are $2.09/share and $1.02/share in contrast to my $2.79 and $1.90. I’m guessing many studies use ’22 EPS as the initial value. I won’t call this unreasonable because only in time can we know if that was a non-recurring item, but I feel my above-stated reasoning for using the trendline is conservative. As another data point, Value Line projects high EPS of $4.25/share: a much higher value that offsets my 2.5-point higher average annual P/E. I believe MOS to be healthy in this study provided the earnings bounceback does occur.

MS LSPF of $23.30 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 22.8 (versus the above-stated 18.7), is 12.4% less than mine (more conservative), and is 22.2% higher (more aggressive) than the $1.02 * 18.7 = $19.07 default.

YETI is a BUY under $41. Given my assumption for bounceback, I will lower this to $39.

All this complication over what to use as an initial projection point is good reason to prefer “up, straight, and parallel.”

BOOT Stock Study (4-26-23)

I recently did a stock study on Boot Barn Holdings Inc. (BOOT) with a closing price of $70.09.

M* writes:

     > Boot Barn Holdings Inc operates specialty retail stores. The
     > company sells western and work-related footwear, apparel, and
     > accessories in the United States. It is a single operating
     > segment, which includes net sales generated from its retail
     > stores and e-commerce websites.

This medium-sized company has grown sales at an annualized rate of 18.5% over the last 10 years and EPS 41.8% per year since 2014. Lines are mostly up, straight, and parallel except for EPS dip in ’15 and projected dip in ’22 (FY ends 3/23). PTPM over the last 10 years has risen from 0.6% to 17% (upside outlier in ’21) with a last-5-year average (excluding the outlier) of 6.6%. This was below peer and industry averages until 2020.

ROE has increased from 10.1% in ’14 to 34.0% in ’21. The last-5-year average is 18.9%, which seems slightly below (above) the industry (peer) average. Debt-to-Capital has averaged 45.7% over the last five years and has been higher than peer and industry averages until ’19. The company has no long-term debt, though, and Interest Coverage is 48.8. Value Line gives a B+ rating for Financial Strength.

I forecast long-term annualized sales growth of 7% based on the following:

I am forecasting just below the range.

I forecast long-term annualized EPS growth of 4% based on the following:

I am forecasting near the lower end of the long-term-estimate range (mean of five: 8.2%).

My Forecast High P/E is 19. High P/E has ranged from 19.3 (’17) to 93.1 (upside outlier in ’15) since 2014. The last-5-year average is 25.6. I am forecasting below the range.

My Forecast Low P/E is 7. Low P/E has ranged from 4.9 (’19) to 31.3 (upside outlier in ’14) since 2014. The last-5-year average is 7.2. I am forecasting higher than values from ’17, ’19, and ’20.

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) is the default value of $38.90. This is 44.5% less than the previous close and 22.5% less than the 52-week low.

These inputs land BOOT in the HOLD zone with an U/D ratio of 1.9. The Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 12.9%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) is 4.6%. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors this study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 133 studies done in the past 90 days (61 outliers and my study excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, and Forecast Low P/E are 9.2%, 10.0%, 20.0, and 7.2. I am lower across the board. Value Line projects a future average annual P/E of 17.0, which is higher than MS (13.6) and higher than me (13.0). MOS seems healthy, here.

With regard to other data, MS high and low EPS are $8.95/share and $5.56/share compared to my $6.76 and $5.56. My high EPS is lower due to a lower forecast growth rate, and the latter is TTM (default) as of today’s date [although this is the first time I’ve never seen these match, I’ll chalk it up to coincidence since the mean low EPS is $5.70]. MS LSPF is $44.60 (14.7% higher than mine), which is ~11% more than the default $5.56 * 7.2 = $40.03, implies a Forecast Low P/E of 8.0, and effectively raises the MS future average P/E to 14.0.

I would look to re-evaluate under $61/share.

LULU Stock Study (4-25-23)

I recently did a stock study on Lululemon Athletica Inc. (LULU) with a closing price of $381.37.

M* writes:

     > Lululemon Athletica Inc. designs, distributes, and markets
     > athletic apparel, footwear, and accessories for women, men,
     > and girls. Lululemon offers pants, shorts, tops, and jackets
     > for both leisure and athletic activities such as yoga and
     > running. The company also sells fitness accessories, such
     > as bags, yoga mats, and equipment.

This medium-size company has grown sales and EPS at rates of 19.2% and 19.4% per year since 2013. Lines are mostly up [EPS dipped in ’14, ’17, ’20, and ’22 (N.B.: Both CFRA and Value Line report earnings growth in this most recently completed FY)], straight, and parallel. PTPM over the last 10 years leads peer and industry averages despite falling from 25.0% in ’13 to 16.4% in ’22 with a last-5-year average of 20.1%.

ROE over the last 10 years is roughly equal to the industry averages while outpacing peers, ranging from 16.8% (’17) to 39.0% (’19) and posting a last-5-year average of 32.9%. Debt-to-Capital was zero through 2018. As the company maintains zero long-term debt, this remains much lower than peer and industry averages with a last-5-year average of 20.2% (leases).

I forecast long-term annualized sales growth of 10% based on the following:

I am forecasting just below the range.

I forecast long-term annualized EPS growth of 13% based on the following:

I am forecasting below the long-term-estimate range (mean of six: 16.7%).

My Forecast High P/E is 36. High P/E has ranged from 37 (’15 and ’16) to 88.9 (upside outlier in ’20) over the last 10 years. The last 5-year average excluding ’20 is 55.5 and trending higher. I am forecasting conservatively just below the range.

My Forecast Low P/E is 30. Low P/E has ranged from 20.7 (’18) to 37.7 (’22) over the last 10 years. The last 5-year average is 30.3. I am forecasting relatively high because anything less makes for an unreasonable Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF).

My LSPF is the default value of $200.40. This is 47.5% less than the previous close and 20.3% less than the 52-week low.

These inputs land LULU in the HOLD zone with an U/D ratio of 0.3. The Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 3.0%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) is 1.3%. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors this study, then I could proceed based on TAR instead. Even this is less than what T-bills are paying right now, however.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 394 studies done in the past 90 days (72 total outliers and my study excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, and Forecast Low P/E are 15.0%, 16.0%, 39.3, and 26.5. I am lower on all but Forecast Low P/E (see explanation above). Value Line projects a future average annual P/E of 31.0, which is lower than MS (32.9) and lower than me (33.0). MOS is hardly discernable in the current study.

With regard to other data, MS high and low EPS are $16.76/share and $8.17/share compared to my $12.31 and $6.68. My high EPS is lower due to a lower forecast growth rate, but I am challenged to explain the latter (see N.B. above). MS Low Stock Price Forecast is $219.30 (9.4% higher than mine). This is consistent with the default $8.17 * 26.5 = $216.50.

From this analyst’s perspective, being up 18.9% in the last six months has this stock overcooked. I would look to re-evaluate under $261/share.