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YETI Stock Study (7-26-23)

Posted by on October 3, 2023 at 06:44 | Last modified: July 26, 2023 14:31

I recently did a stock study on YETI Holdings (YETI) with a closing price of $41.50.

M* writes:

     > YETI Holdings Inc is a designer, marketer, and distributor of premium
     > products for the outdoor and recreation market sold under the YETI
     > brand. The company offers products including coolers and equipment,
     > drinkware, and other accessories. Its trademark products include YETI,
     > Tundra, Hopper, YETI TANK, Rambler, Colster, Rambler Colster, Roadie,
     > and Wildly Stronger! Keep Ice Longer!, SideKick, FatWall, PermaFrost,
     > T-Rex, ColdLock, NeverFail, AnchorPoint, InterLock, BearFoot, Vortex,
     > DoubleHaul, LipGrip, Vortex, DryHide, ColdCell, HydroLock, Over-the-
     > Nose, and LOAD-AND-LOCK. The company distributes products through
     > wholesale channels and through direct-to-consumer, or DTC, channels.

This medium-size company has grown sales and earnings at annualized rates of 32.5% and 19.3% over the last 9 and 7 years, respectively [’13-’14 EPS excluded due to small fractional values that artificially inflate the growth rate]. The visual inspection is mediocre. Sales are up and straight except for spike in ’15 and decline in ’17. EPS are down in ’16, ’17, ’19, and ’22 [I am excluding the latter 57.1% YOY decline due to operational snafus including recall of defective items and inflation-induced demand destruction per Value Line]. PTPM has led peer and industry averages with a last-5-year mean of 12.3%.

ROE averages 47.6% over the last four years (too brief a history to compare peer and industry averages). Debt-to-Capital is declining since ’16 and falls below peer and industry averages in ’20 with a last-5-year mean of 50.9% [23.8% in ’22].

Value Line rates the company B+ for Financial Strength. Interest Coverage is 23.7 and Quick Ratio is 0.80.

With regard to sales growth:

I am forecasting conservatively toward the bottom of the range at 6.0% per year.

With regard to EPS growth:

I am forecasting below the long-term-estimate range (mean of five: 10.1%) at 8.0% per year. As the initial value, I will not use ’22 EPS of $1.03/share or Q1 ’23 EPS of $0.85/share (annualized) since those numbers are affected by product recall and production issues [strange that CFRA is the only data source projecting huge percentage increases relative to the depressed ’22 EPS]. Instead, I will use ’20 EPS of $1.77/share and extrapolate to $1.77/share * (1.08 ^ 5) = $2.60/share. I can almost ($2.56/share) get to this as a [website] workaround with a 20.0% growth rate and ’22 EPS.

My Forecast High P/E is 31.0. With the stock trading publicly since 2018, high P/E has increased since 31.1 in ’18 for a last-5-year mean of 53.0. The last-5-year-mean average P/E is 36.9. I am forecasting below the range.

My Forecast Low P/E is 16.0. Over the past five years, low P/E ranges from 8.6 (perhaps a downside outlier) in ’20 to 27.0 in ’22 with a last-5-year mean of 20.8. I am forecasting conservatively (18.0 in ’18 being the second-lowest value).

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) of $26.60 is the default value based on of $1.77/share. This is 35.9% less than the previous close and 4.7% less than the 52-week low.

These inputs land YETI in the HOLD zone with a U/D ratio of 2.6. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 13.9%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) of 7.3% is less than I prefer for a medium-size company. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors this study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on only 58 studies done in the past 90 days (23 outliers and my study excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, and Forecast Low P/E are 10.3%, 13.0%, 31.1, and 17.4. I am lower across the board. Value Line projects a future average annual P/E of 20.0, which is lower than MS (24.3) and me (23.5).

MS high / low EPS is $1.82 / $0.85 vs. my $2.56 / $1.77 (per share). I think many studies are using ’22 for low EPS. Not only would I argue this to be unreasonable, it also obscures MOS.

MS LSPF of $17.70 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 20.8 vs. the above-stated 17.4. MS LSPF is 19.7% greater than the default value of $0.85/share * 17.4 = $14.79/share, which results in more aggressive zoning and suggests MS studies may not be comfortable with the $0.85. MS LSPF, which I believe to be unreasonably low, is 33.5% less than mine.

With regard to valuation metrics, PEG ratio is 2.0 per Zacks while Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] is 1.32 per M*. Both suggest the stock to be overvalued. According to Kim Butcher’s “quick and dirty DCF,” the stock should be priced at 17 * [$4.85 – ($0.00 + $0.70)] = $70.55 (i.e. stock undervalued by 41.0%).

I would look to re-evaluate PAR with the stock under $39/share.

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FWRD Stock Study (8-16-23)

Posted by on September 30, 2023 at 07:10 | Last modified: August 16, 2023 10:53

I recently did a stock study on Forward Air Corp. (FWRD) with a closing price of $67.44. Previous studies are here and here.

M* writes:

     > Forward Air Corp is an asset-light freight and logistics company. The
     > company’s operating segment includes Expedited Freight and Intermodal.
     > It generates maximum revenue from the Expedited Freight segment.
     > Expedited Freight segment operates a comprehensive national network
     > to provide expedited regional, inter-regional and national LTL
     > (less-than-truckload) services. It also offers customers local
     > pick-up and delivery and other services including final mile,
     > truckload, shipment consolidation and deconsolidation, warehousing,
     > customs brokerage, and other handling.

Over the past decade, this medium-size company has grown sales and earnings at annualized rates of 11.5% and 14.9%, respectively. This excludes sharp EPS dips in ’16 and ’20. Lines are mostly up and parallel except for a sales decline in ’20 and, in addition to the dips just mentioned, EPS dips in ’15 and ’19. PTPM mostly leads peer and industry averages while ranging from 5.5% in ’20 to 13.2% in ’22 with a last-5-year mean of 9.1%.

Also over the past decade, ROE trails peer and industry averages despite trending higher from 12.9% in ’13 to 27.7% in ’22 with a last-5-year mean of 17.8%. Debt-to-Capital is lower than peer and industry averages despite trending higher from 0% in ’13 to 28.2% in ’22 with a last-5-year mean of 26.0%.

Quick Ratio is 1.15, and Interest Coverage is 26.4. Value Line rates the company B++ for Financial Strength.

With regard to sales growth:

My forecast is consistent with the long-term estimate at zero growth per year.

With regard to EPS growth:

I am forecasting conservatively toward the bottom of the long-term-estimate range (mean of four: 9.8%) at 2.0% per year. I will use 2023 Q2 EPS of $5.66/share (annualized) as the initial value rather than ’22 EPS of $7.14.

My Forecast High P/E is 19.0. Over the past decade, high P/E has gone from 25.2 in ’13 up to 56.4 in ’17 then down to 17.6 in ’22 with a last-5-year mean of 27.1. The last-5-year-mean average P/E is 21.9. I am forecasting near the bottom of the range (only ’22 is lower).

My Forecast Low P/E is 9.0. Over the past decade, low P/E has generally trended lower (excluding upside outlier of 40.0 in ’16) from 19.9 in ’13 to 11.8 in ’22 with a last-5-year mean of 16.7. I am forecasting below the entire range.

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) of $50.90 is default based on $5.66/share initial value. This is 24.5% less than the previous close (and 52-week low).

Over the past decade, the lowest Payout Ratio is 13.4% in ’22 and the last-5-year mean is 23.4%. I am conservatively forecasting at 13.0%.

These inputs land FWRD in the BUY zone with a U/D ratio of 3.1. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 12.7%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) is 6.3%, which is less than I seek for a medium-size company. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors this study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on only 67 studies done in the past 90 days (my study and 14 outliers excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, Forecast Low P/E, and Payout Ratio are 8.6%, 8.9%, 21.9, 15.1, and 23.9%. I am lower across the board. Value Line’s future average annual P/E of 23.0 is higher than both MS (18.5) and mine (14.0).

MS high / low EPS are $10.12 / $5.26 vs. my $6.25 / $5.66 (per share). My high EPS is lower due to a lower growth rate.

MS LSPF of $71.30 is currently invalid due to the recent decline in stock price. My LSPF is 28.6% less.

My TAR (over 15.0% preferred) is less than the 17.1% from MS.

MOS backing the current study seems robust. My forecast P/E range is [much] lower than Value Line and MS and my forecast growth rates are bottom of the barrel.

I track a few different valuation metrics. PEG is 5.8 per my projected P/E (with the low 2.0% growth rate): significantly overvalued. Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] per M* is significantly undervalued at 0.54. Kim Butcher’s “quick and dirty DCF” prices the stock at 15.5 * [$8.90 – ($1.20 + $1.75)] = $92.23 thereby suggesting the stock to be undervalued by 27.0%

The stock is at the edge of the BUY zone right now. A price under $59/share would likely qualify TAR.

How do I figure?

My inputs forecast a high stock price of $118.70/share. Dividing by the proposed purchase price of $59/share equals 2.01, which amounts to a 5-year annualized return of [ (2.01 ^ (1/5) – 1) * 100] = 15.0%.

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NFLX Stock Study (7-25-23)

Posted by on September 29, 2023 at 07:01 | Last modified: July 25, 2023 11:16

I recently did a stock study on Netflix Inc. (NFLX) with a closing price of $428.37. Previous studies are here and here.

M* writes:

     > Netflix’s primary business is a streaming video on demand
     > service now available in almost every country worldwide
     > except China. The firm primarily generates revenue from
     > subscriptions to its eponymous service. Netflix delivers
     > original and third-party digital video content to PCs,
     > internet-connected TVs, and consumer electronic devices,
     > including tablets, video game consoles, Apple TV, Roku,
     > and Chromecast. Netflix is the largest SVOD platform in
     > the world with over 220 million subscribers globally.

Over the past decade, this large-size company has grown sales and earnings at annualized rates of 26.6% and 58.4%, respectively. Lines are mostly up and parallel except for EPS declines in ’15 and ’22. PTPM lags peer and industry averages despite trending higher from 3.9% in ’13 to 16.6% in ’22 with a last-5-year mean of 13.4%.

Also over the past decade, ROE lags peer and industry averages while trending up from 9.2% in ’13 to 21.6% in ’22 with a last-5-year mean of 26.0%. Debt-to-Capital, which overall is higher than peers and lower than the industry, increases from 27.3% in ’13 to 66.4% in ’18 before declining to 40.9% in ’22 for a last-5-year mean of 56.5%.

Interest Coverage and Quick Ratio are 7.5 and 1.1, respectively. M* gives the company a “Standard” rating for Capital Allocation while Value Line gives an A for Financial Strength.

With regard to sales growth:

I am forecasting toward the low end of the range at 7.0% per year.

With regard to EPS growth:

I am forecasting just under the long-term-estimate range (mean of six: 22.1%) at 13.0%. I will use 2023 Q2 EPS of $9.39/share (annualized) as the initial value rather than ’22 EPS of $9.95.

My Forecast High P/E is 35.0. Over the past decade, high P/E has decreased from 211 in ’13 to 61.3 in ’22 with a last-5-year mean trending lower at 93.9. The last-5-year-mean average P/E is 71.0. At some point, I expect P/E to fall back to earth. For now, I am forecasting at the upper end of my comfort zone.

My Forecast Low P/E is 25.0. Over the past decade, low P/E has decreased from 49.1 in ’13 to 16.4 in ’22 with a last-5-year mean trending lower at 48.1. Again, at some point I expect P/E to fall back to earth and we may already be starting to see this. I am forecasting toward the bottom of the 10-year range (only ’22 is lower).

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) of $234.80 is the default based on $9.39/share initial value. This is 45.2% less than the previous close but 11.0% greater than the 52-week low.

These inputs land NFLX in the HOLD zone with a U/D ratio of 0.9. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 7.2%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) is 3.9%, which is lower than the current yield on T-bills. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors this study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 188 studies done in the past 90 days (54 outliers and my study excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, and Forecast Low P/E are 10.3%, 13.1%, 50.0, and 30.0. I am lower across the board. Value Line projects a future average annual P/E of 38.0, which is lower than MS (40.0) and higher than me (30.0).

MS high/low EPS is $17.53/$9.35 vs. my $17.30/$9.39 (per share). These numbers are in very close agreement, which I actually find quite interesting. My EPS growth rate is over 900 basis points less than the mean. With regard to the two most popular sources Value Line (high EPS $18.85) and M* (high EPS $22.67), I am 60 and 490 basis points less, respectively. For these reasons, I would have expected the difference between high EPS to be larger.

MS LSPF of $232.50 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 24.9 vs. the above-stated 30.0. MS LSPF is 17.1% less than the default value of $9.35/share * 30.0 = $280.50, which results in more conservative zoning. MS LSPF is also 1.0% less than mine.

Mainly due to the lower P/E range, MOS in the current study seems robust.

PEG ratio and Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] are two metrics I have been monitoring. PEG is 3.1 (1.5) based on my (Zacks) EPS growth rate while Relative Value is 0.64 per M*. The former (latter) suggests the stock to be overvalued (undervalued).

According to Kim Butcher’s “quick and dirty DCF,” the stock should be priced at 12 * [$57.00 – ($0.00 + $1.25)] = $669.00 (i.e. stock undervalued by 36.0%).

The current study finds NFLX to be far above the BUY zone because as mentioned above, I expect the P/E range to eventually normalize resulting in a lower [forecast] stock price [range]. I would look to re-evaluate NFLX under $327/share.

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ABG Stock Study (7-19-23)

Posted by on September 27, 2023 at 06:56 | Last modified: July 21, 2023 09:48

I recently did a stock study on Asbury Automotive Group, Inc. (ABG) with a closing price of $247.42.

CFRA writes:

     > Asbury Automotive Group, Inc., is one of the largest U.S.-based
     > automotive retailers. The company offers a range of automotive
     > products and services, including the sale of new and used
     > vehicles; vehicle maintenance and repair services; replacement
     > parts; vehicle financing; and aftermarket products such as
     > insurance, warranties, and service contracts. As of the end of
     > 2022, the company operated 139 dealerships at 187 franchise
     > locations for the sale and servicing of 31 different brands of
     > both new and used American, European, and Asian automobiles.

Over the past decade, this large-size company has grown sales and earnings at annualized rates of 8.8% and 28.9%, respectively. Lines are narrowing and mostly up despite sales declines in ’16, ’17, and ’20 and an EPS dip in ’17. PTPM is greater than peer and industry averages by trending up from 3.1% in ’13 to 8.5% in ’22 with a last-5-year mean of 5.4%.

Also over the past decade, ROE leads peer and industry averages with a range from 20.3% in ’14 to 61.5% in ’16 and a last-5-year mean of 35.8%. Debt-to-Capital is higher than peer and industry averages by going from 71.3% in ’13 to 86.5% in ’16 then falling to 56.0% in ’22 for a last-5-year mean of 70.3%.

Interest Coverage is 8.9 and Quick Ratio 0.59. M* awards a Standard rating for Capital Allocation, saying “balance sheet… [is] in decent shape both in terms of debt maturity timing… and [a] debt level [perspective].” Value Line gives a B+ rating for Financial Strength.

With regard to sales growth:

Given the lower/contracting shorter-term estimates, I am discounting the Value Line projection by 50% to get a conservative forecast of 5.0%.

With regard to EPS growth:

For my conservative forecast, I am [more than] halving the 6-long-term-estimate mean (8.4%) to get 4.0%. I will use ’23 Q1 EPS of $42.62/share (annualized) as the initial value rather than ’22 EPS of $44.61.

My Forecast High P/E is 6.5. Over the past decade, high P/E has trended down from 17.2 (’13) to 4.6 (’22) with a last-5-year mean of 9.4. The last-5-year-mean average P/E is 7.2. I am forecasting just below the latter (only ’22 is lower).

My Forecast Low P/E is 3.5. Over the past decade, low P/E has trended down from 9.7 (’13) to 3.1 (’22) with a last-5-year mean of 5.0. I am forecasting near the bottom of the range (3.0 in ’20).

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) of $149.20 is the default based on $42.62/share initial value. This is 39.7% below the previous closing price and 7.4% greater than the 52-week low.

These inputs land ABG in the HOLD zone with a U/D ratio of 0.9. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 6.4%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) of 0.9% is less than the current yield on T-bills. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors this study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on only 21 studies over the past 90 days (my study and 6 other outliers excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, and Forecast Low P/E are 7.0%, 10.7%, 9.4, and 5.5, respectively. I am lower across the board. Value Line projects an average annual P/E of 5.0, which is lower than MS (7.5) and equal to mine.

MS high/low EPS is $68.64/$34.30 vs. my $51.85/$42.62 (per share). I’m not sure where the $34.30 comes from, but my high EPS is lower due to a lower EPS growth rate and my overall EPS range is lower.

MS LSPF of $146.00 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 4.3 vs. the above-stated 5.5. MS LSPF is 22.6% less than the default $34.30/share * 5.5 = $188.65, which results in more conservative zoning. MS LSPF is also 2.1% less than mine.

I think the MS sample size is too small from which to draw valid conclusions.

Regardless, I deem MOS in the current study to be robust. It seems nonexistent based on Value Line’s projected [high] EPS of $50.00/share, but it seems robust based on M* projected EPS of $86.65. My forecast is very conservative (see above).

PEG ratio and Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] are two metrics I now monitor. PEG is 0.42 based on Zacks’ 18.5% long-term EPS growth rate while Relative Value is 0.81 per M*. Both suggest the stock to be undervalued.

Kim Butcher’s “quick & dirty DCF” prices the stock at 3.5 * [$60.00 – ($0.00 + $8.50)] = $180.25 (i.e. overvalued by 37.0%).

I would look to re-evaluate ABG under $196/share.

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TROW Stock Study (7-20-23)

Posted by on September 25, 2023 at 07:02 | Last modified: July 20, 2023 14:07

I recently did a stock study on T. Rowe Price Group Inc. (TROW) with a closing price of $121.27.

M* writes:

     > T. Rowe Price provides asset-management services for individual and
     > institutional investors. It offers a broad range of no-load U.S. and
     > international stock, hybrid, bond, and money market funds…
     > Approximately two thirds of the company’s managed assets are held in
     > retirement-based accounts, which provides T. Rowe Price with a
     > somewhat stickier client base than most of its peers. The firm also
     > manages private accounts, provides retirement planning advice, and
     > offers discount brokerage and trust services.

Over the past decade, this medium-size company has grown sales and EPS 8.3% and 11.6% per year, respectively. Lines are up, straight, and parallel until 2022 when both decline [significantly]. PTPM is above industry averages and mostly above peer averages in ranging from 44.4% to 52.3% before dropping to 30.0% in ’22 for a last-5-year mean of 46.2%.

Also over the past decade, ROE has been higher than peer and industry averages by trending up from 22.5% in ’13 to 36.4% in ’21 before falling to 16.9% in ’22 for a last-5-year mean of 28.4%. Debt-to-Capital is much lower than peer and industry averages since the company has no debt on its books.

Quick Ratio is an eye-popping 5.5. Value Line rates the company A+ for Financial Strength while M* gives an “Exemplary” rating for Capital Allocation and a “Wide” Economic Moat classification.

With regard to sales growth:

I am forecasting below both long-term estimates at 2.0% per year.

With regard to EPS growth:

I am forecasting -1.0% per year, which is below the six-estimate long-term mean (+1.0%) of three positives and three negatives. I will use 2023 Q1 EPS of $6.11/share (annualized) as the initial value rather than ’22 EPS of $6.70.

My Forecast High P/E is 23.0. Over the past decade, high P/E trends down from 21.5 in ’13 to 17.1 in ’21 before spiking to 29.7 in ’22 [E down, P/E up] for a last-5-year mean of 18.9. The last-5-year-mean average P/E is 14.9. I would like to go below the entire range at 14.0, but that results in an invalid study. Out of necessity, I am forecasting higher.

My Forecast Low P/E is 7.0. Over the past decade, low P/E has ranged from 8.3 in ’20 to 17.0 in ’13 while mostly trending lower (until the EPS dive in ’22). The last-5-year mean is 11.0. I am forecasting below the entire range.

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) of $33.30 is the default based on $4.75/share initial value. I would typically assume zero growth by using the previous year as low EPS, but forecasting contraction for high EPS is worse than zero growth. Looking at the graph, I am [arbitrarily] selecting ’16 as low EPS since the earnings explosion begins the following year (’17).

My LSPF is 72.5% less than the previous close and 64.4% less than the 52-week low. This is more extreme than I have ever had for a LSPF but it seems necessary to maintain validity of the other inputs.

Over the past decade, Payout Ratio ranges from 32.9% in ’21 to 71.6% (upside outlier in ’22). The last-5-year mean (excluding ’22) is 35.6%. I am forecasting below the entire range at 32.0%.

These inputs land TROW in the SELL zone with a U/D ratio of 0.1. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 3.5%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) of -4.0% screams “I WOULDN’T TOUCH THAT WITH A 10-FOOT POLE!” Never before have I seen PAR negative. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors this study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead but even that has a long way to go before I’d consider investment since it is less than the current yield on T-bills.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 214 studies over the past 90 days (my study and 80 outliers excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, Forecast Low P/E, and Payout Ratio are 6.0%, 7.7%, 17.7, 11.0, and 41.1%, respectively. Only my Forecast High P/E is higher (out of necessity). Value Line projects a future average annual P/E of 16.0: higher than MS (14.4) and mine (15.0).

MS high/low EPS is $9.78/$6.11 vs. my $5.81/$4.75 (per share). I am lower on growth rates and much lower on EPS range.

MS LSPF of $77.80 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 12.7 vs. the above-stated 11.0. MS LSPF is 15.8% greater than the default value of $6.11/share * 11.0 = $67.21, which results in more aggressive zoning. MS LSPF is also 134% greater than mine.

PEG ratio and Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] are two metrics I have started to monitor. PEG is 2.97 per Zacks 6.0% EPS growth rate while Relative Value is 1.33 per M*. Both suggest the stock to be overvalued.

As mentioned above, my LSPF seems unreasonably low. Perhaps this is what happens when long-term growth rates go negative. In my short history doing these stock studies, what I usually see after precipitous EPS declines are long-term earnings projections roughly equal to or greater than historical [as if to catch back up to trendline]. Such is not the case here, which may be indicative of a broken company rather than the higher-quality stock we aim to find.

I would look to re-evaluate TROW under $58/share.

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G Stock Study (8-14-23)

Posted by on September 22, 2023 at 06:46 | Last modified: August 14, 2023 15:09

I recently did a stock study on Genpact Ltd. (G) with a closing price of $37.18. The original study is here.

M* writes:

     > Genpact Ltd is a provider of business process management
     > services. Clients are industry verticals and operate in banking and
     > financial services, insurance, capital markets, consumer product
     > goods, life sciences, infrastructure, manufacturing and services,
     > healthcare, and high-tech. Genpact’s services include aftermarket,
     > procurement, risk and compliance, human resources, IT, industrial
     > direct solutions, collections, finance and accounting, and media
     > services. Genpact’s end market by revenue is India. The company
     > is a General Electric spin-off, which is still a large source of
     > revenue for Genpact.

Over the past decade, this medium-size company has grown sales and EPS at annualized rates of 8.5% and 8.9%, respectively. Lines are most up, straight, and parallel except for EPS dips in ’14 and ’22. PTPM leads peer and industry averages despite falling from 14.4% in ’13 to 10.6% in ’22 with a last-5-year mean of 11.4%.

Also over the past decade, ROE slightly trails the industry while beating peer averages by ranging from 14.9% in ’14 to 21.4% in ’18 with a last-5-year mean of 18.9%. Debt-to-Capital is lower than industry averages and about even with peers despite climbing from 33.4% in ’13 to 48.2% in ’22 with a last-5-year mean of 50.3%.

Quick Ratio is 1.6 and Interest Coverage is 9.5. Value Line rates the company B++ for Financial Strength and CFRA describes the balance sheet as “clean, with a low net debt-to-EBITDA ratio of 1.4x on a TTM basis.”

With regard to sales growth:

I am forecasting just below the long-term estimate at 7.0% per year.

With regard to EPS growth:

I am forecasting below the long-term-estimate range (mean of five: 10.1%) at 8.0% per year. My initial value is ’22 EPS of $1.88/share rather than 2023 Q2 EPS of $2.19 (annualized).

My Forecast High P/E is 22.0. Over the past decade, high P/E has trended up from 22.0 in ’13 to 28.8 in ’20 with a last-5-year mean of 27.7. The last-5-year-mean average P/E is 23.1. I am forecasting conservatively at the bottom of the range.

My Forecast Low P/E is 15.0. Over the past decade, low P/E has trended up from 15.8 in ’13 to 20.0 in ’21/’22 with a last-5-year average of 18.6 (downside outlier 12.4 in ’20 excluded). I am forecasting conservatively below the range.

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) of $28.20 is default based on $1.88/share initial value. This is 24.2% less than the previous closing price and 20.1% less than the 52-week low.

Since dividend payment was instituted, Payout Ratio has increased from 17.9% in ’17 to 26.6% in ’22 with a last-5-year average of 23.3%. I am forecasting near the bottom of the range at 18.0%.

These inputs land G in the HOLD zone with a U/D ratio of 2.6. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 11.1%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) is 7.5%, which is less than I seek for a medium-size company. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors this study, then I can proceed based on the total annualized return (TAR) of 11.1% instead.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on only 48 studies (my study and 15 outliers excluded) over the past 90 days, averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, Forecast Low P/E, and Payout Ratio are 8.1%, 9.8%, 25.0, 16.8, and 22.2%. I am lower across the board. Value Line’s projected average annual P/E of 17.0 is lower than MS (20.9) and mine (18.5).

MS high / low EPS are $3.07 / $1.89 vs. my $2.76 / $1.88 (per share). My high EPS is lower due to a lower EPS growth rate.

MS LSPF of $31.30 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 16.6, which is very close to the above-stated 16.8. Being 11.0% greater than mine, this is relatively aggressive zoning.

My TAR (over 15.0% preferred) is less than the 16.8% from MS.

MOS backing the current study seems robust.

I track a few different valuation metrics. PEG is 1.3 and 2.0 per Zacks and my projected P/E, respectively; the latter is overvalued. Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] per M* is undervalued at 0.74. Kim Butcher’s “quick and dirty DCF” prices the stock at 14.0 * [$6.00 – ($0.95 + $0.85)] = $58.80, which suggests the stock as undervalued by 37.0%.

Although the stock is a BUY under $36/share, I would look to re-evaluate closer to $30/share in hopes of qualifying TAR.

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TGT Stock Study (7-18-23)

Posted by on September 21, 2023 at 07:06 | Last modified: July 18, 2023 14:45

I recently did a stock study on Target Corp. (TGT) with a closing price of $130.01. Previous studies are here and here.

CFRA writes:

     > Incorporated in 1902 and headquartered in Minneapolis, Target
     > Corporation is one of the largest retailers in the U.S. As of
     > January 29, 2022, the company operated 1,926 Target locations
     > in the U.S. with 243.3 million square feet of floor space, up
     > from 1,897 stores with 241.6 million square feet of floor
     > space twelve months earlier. Target currently has stores in
     > all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Its stores
     > generally cater to middle- and upper-income consumers,
     > carrying a broad assortment of fashion apparel, electronics,
     > home furnishings, household products, and other general
     > merchandise. Target.com offers a more extensive selection of
     > merchandise than the company’s physical stores, including
     > exclusive online products.

Over the past decade, this mega-sized company (revenue > $50B) has grown sales and earnings at annualized rates of 4.9% and 11.9%, respectively. Lines are mostly up except for dips in sales (’16) and EPS (’16 and ’22). PTPM leads peer and industry averages throughout the decade despite a disappointing ’22 contributing to a last-5-year mean of 5.5%.

Also over the past decade, ROE leads peer and industry averages by increasing from 12.0% (’13) to 25.0% (’22) and posting a last 5-year mean of 31.9%. Debt-to-Capital is higher than peer and industry averages, increasing from 45.9% (’13) to 62.9% (’22) with a last-5-year mean of 55.7%. Quick Ratio is chronically low (0.07 in the last quarter), but Interest Coverage is 7.6. Value Line gives a B++ rating for Financial Strength while M* assigns an Exemplary rating for Capital Allocation.

With regard to the EPS dip [crash: down 57.6% YOY] in ’22, Value Line wrote:

     > Followers of this story will recall that the bottom line last year
     > was torpedoed when management announced a serious inventory
     > bloat would be worked down by across-the-board discounting.
     > Shortly thereafter, a clearance run event was held to get
     > shoppers to spend at the tail end of the holiday season, thus
     > again clearing inventory space for items geared toward warmer
     > weather. The end result was a sharp drop in profitability and
     > a full-year earnings figure of just $5.98 a share.

With regard to sales growth:

I am forecasting conservatively at 1.0% per year.

With regard to EPS growth:

I get suspicious when I see a big YOY change accompanied by diametrically-opposed estimates. The opposing long-term estimates here are -7.5% and -0.6% vs. 24.5% and 21.1%. I assume the time frames to be identical, but what if they’re not? I go into detail about this at the second link above.

Given the high degree of uncertainty (two negative long-term estimates), I am forecasting conservatively by more than halving the 6-long-term-estimate mean to 4.0% per year. I will use the 2022 trendline of $9.52/share as the initial value since ’22 EPS is unusually low (see discussion above).

My Forecast High P/E is 15.0. Over the past decade, high P/E has ranged from 14.8 (’17) to 42.6 (upside outlier in ’22) with a last-5-year mean (excluding the outlier) of 19.8. The last-5-year-mean average P/E is 15.4. I am forecasting near the bottom of the range (only ’17 is lower).

My Forecast Low P/E is 10.5. Over the past decade, low P/E has ranged from 9.1 (’17) to 22.9 (’22). Low P/E has been less than 14.2 in every year since ’14, which makes the 22.9 somewhat of an upside outlier. Excluding that, the last-5-year mean is 11.0. I am forecasting near the low end of the range [only ’17 and ’20 (10.4) are lower].

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) is the default based on $9.52/share initial value. This is 23.1% less than the previous close and 20.1% less than the 52-week low.

Over the last 10 years, Payout Ratio has ranged from 22.4% (’21) to 66.2% (’22). The last-5-year mean is 41.3%. I am forecasting conservatively at 22.0%.

These inputs land TGT in the HOLD zone with a U/D ratio of 1.5. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 7.4%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) of 4.3% is less than the current yield on T-bills. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors this study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 131 studies over the past 90 days (my study and 48 other outliers excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, Forecast Low P/E, and Payout Ratio are 3.9%, 10.1%, 19.5, 11.5, and 41.3%, respectively. I am lower across the board. Value Line projects an average annual P/E of 15.0, which is lower than MS (15.5) and higher than mine (12.8).

MS high/low EPS is $10.32/$5.87 vs. my $11.58/$9.52 (per share). Many MS studies use ’22 for low EPS, which I think is unreasonable since the well-documented inventory issues color this as a nonrecurring event. This skews the entire MS EPS range lower (e.g. Value Line and M* have projected high EPS of $17.90/share and $15.57/share).

MS LSPF of $82.20 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 14.0 vs. the above-stated 11.5. MS LSPF is 21.8% greater than the default value of $5.87/share * 11.5 = $67.51, which results in much more aggressive zoning. MS LSPF is 17.8% less than mine, however. MS LSPF is a level not seen since 2019 while the default value has not been seen since 2018. The 21.8% discrepancy is much larger than usual. Further evidence of chaos?

Although tempting, I can’t quite reject MS outright and call MOS healthy in the current study. I would call it moderate.

PEG ratio and Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] are two metrics I have recently begun to monitor. PEG is 1.03 (Zacks) while Relative Value is 1.44 (M*). The latter is suggestive of an overvalued stock, but I would argue 1.44 to be artificially high due to ’22 EPS.

I am also starting to familiarize myself with Kim Butcher’s “quick and dirty DCF.” According to this method, the stock should be valued at 10 * [$24.55 – ($0.00 + $6.40)] = $181.50 (i.e. stock undervalued by 28.0%).

I would look to re-evaluate TGT under $118/share.

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ULTA Stock Study (7-18-23)

Posted by on September 19, 2023 at 06:21 | Last modified: July 18, 2023 14:03

I recently did a stock study on Ulta Beauty, Inc. (ULTA) with a closing price of $472.72. The original study is here.

M* writes:

     > With roughly 1,350 stores and a partnership with narrow-moat
     > Target, Ulta Beauty is the largest specialized beauty retailer
     > in the U.S. The firm offers makeup (43% of 2021 sales),
     > fragrances, skin care, and hair care products (20% of 2021
     > sales), and bath and body items. Ulta offers private-label
     > products and merchandise from more than 500 vendors. It also
     > offers salon services, including hair, makeup, skin, and brow
     > services, in all stores. Most Ulta stores are approximately
     > 10,000 square feet and are in suburban strip centers.

Over the past decade, this large-size company has grown sales and earnings at annualized rates of 14.7% and 18.9%, respectively. Lines are mostly up, straight, and parallel except for a sales/EPS dip in ’20. PTPM leads peer and industry averages by increasing from 12.3% to 16.1% with a last-5-year mean (excluding ’20, which was a downside outlier) of 14.0%.

Also over the past decade, ROE leads peer and industry averages by increasing from 21.8% to 62.9% with a last-5-year mean (excluding ’20, which was a downside outlier) of 45.8%. Debt-to-Capital is less than peer and industry averages. The company has no long-term debt, but the last-5-year mean is 40.6% (uncapitalized leases).

Current Ratio is 1.64 and Quick Ratio is 0.51. M* rates the company Exemplary for Capital Allocation, and Value Line gives an A rating for Financial Strength.

With regard to sales growth:

I am forecasting conservatively below the range at 5.0%.

With regard to EPS growth:

I am forecasting near the bottom of the long-term-estimate range (mean of six: 10.2%) at 6.0%. I will use ’23 EPS of $24.01/share as the initial value rather than ’24 Q1 EPS of $24.60 (annualized).

My Forecast High P/E is 21.0. Over the past decade, high P/E has trended down from 42.1 in ’13 to 21.4 in ’22 with a last-5-year mean of 26.2 (excluding 99.8 upside outlier in ’20). The last-5-year-mean average P/E is 21.3. I am forecasting below the entire range.

My Forecast Low P/E is 14.0. Over the past decade, low P/E has trended down from 23.0 in ’13 to 13.8 in ’22. The last-5-year mean (excluding 39.9 upside outlier in ’20) is 16.3. I am forecasting near the bottom of the range (only ’22 is lower).

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) is the default $336.10 based on $24.01/share initial value. This is 28.9% less than the last closing price and 6.8% less than the 52-week low.

These inputs land ULTA in the HOLD zone with a U/D ratio of 1.5. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 7.4%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) of 3.5% is less than the current yield on T-bills. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors this study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 451 studies over the past 90 days (my study and 75 outliers excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, and Forecast Low P/E are 9.0%, 9.7%, 26.2, and 18.1, respectively. I am lower across the board. Value Line projects a future average annual P/E of 21.0, which is lower than MS (22.2) and higher than mine (17.5).

MS high/low EPS is $38.14/$18.93 vs. my $32.13/$24.01 (per share). 91 studies used low EPS under $10.00/share. Except for ’20 at $3.11, the company hasn’t seen earnings that low since 2017 (at $8.96/share, and 70 studies used a number less than that). I would argue these to be unreasonably low. As for high EPS, mine is lower due to a lower EPS growth rate.

MS LSPF of $304.90 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 16.1 vs. the above-stated 18.1. MS LSPF is 12.4% less than the default value of $18.93/share * 18.1 = $342.63, which results in more conservative zoning. MS LSPF is also 9.3% less than mine.

PEG ratio and Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] are two metrics I have recently begun to monitor. PEG is 1.54 (Zacks) while Relative Value is 0.90 (M*). These suggest the stock to be overvalued and undervalued, respectively.

I am also starting to familiarize myself with Kim Butcher’s “quick and dirty DCF.” According to this method, the stock should be priced at 17 * [$38.50 – ($0.00 + $0.00)] = $654.50 (i.e. stock undervalued by 28.0%).

I would look to re-evaluate ULTA under $420/share.

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RMD Stock Study (8-9-23)

Posted by on September 16, 2023 at 06:17 | Last modified: August 9, 2023 15:42

I recently did a stock study on ResMed Inc. (RMD) with a closing price of $179.27.

M* writes:

     > ResMed is one of the largest respiratory care device companies
     > globally, primarily developing and supplying flow generators,
     > masks and accessories for the treatment of sleep apnea.
     > Increasing diagnosis of sleep apnea combined with ageing
     > populations and increasing prevalence of obesity is resulting
     > in a structurally growing market. The company earns roughly
     > two thirds of its revenue in the Americas and the balance
     > across other regions dominated by Europe, Japan and Australia.
     > Recent developments and acquisitions have focused on digital
     > health as ResMed is aiming to differentiate itself through
     > the provision of clinical data for use by the patient,
     > medical care advisor and payer in the out-of-hospital setting.

Over the past decade, this medium-size company has grown sales and earnings at annualized rates of 11.7% and 10.9%, respectively. Lines are mostly up, straight, and parallel except for rockiness in EPS (dips in ’17, ’18, and ’21). PTPM leads peer and industry averages while ranging from 19.9% in ’19 to 27.7% in ’14 with a last-5-year mean of 25.0%.

Also over the past decade, ROE leads peer and industry averages while ranging from 15.1% in ’18 to 27.4% in ’20 with a last-5-year mean of 22.2%. Debt-to-Capital is lower than the industry and roughly even with peers while increasing from 14.6% in ’14 to 27.7% in ’23 with a last-5-year mean of 28.6%.

Value Line rates the company A for Financial Strength and M* rates them “Exemplary” for Capital Allocation. Quick Ratio is 1.2.

With regard to sales growth:

I am forecasting near the bottom of the range at 7.0% per year.

With regard to EPS growth:

FY ends Jun 30, which creates some labeling conflict between data sources.

I am forecasting below the long-term estimate range [mean of six: 12.2%] at 9.0% per year. I will use ’23 EPS of $6.09/share as the initial value.

My Forecast High P/E is 30.0. Over the past decade, high P/E has trended up from 24.0 in ’14 to 40.7 in ’23 with a last-5-year mean of 52.7. The last-5-year-mean average P/E is 44.1. I am forecasting near the bottom of the range [only ’14 and ’16 (25.8) are lower].

My Forecast Low P/E is 23.0. Over the past decade, low P/E has trended up from 17.4 in ’14 to 33.2 in ’23 with a last-5-year mean of 35.6. My forecast would be the lowest value since 2016.

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) of $140.10 is default based on $6.09/share initial value. This is 21.8% less than the previous closing price and 21.4% less than the 52-week low.

Over the past decade, Payout Ratio decreases from 41.8% in ’14 to 28.9% in ’23 with a last-5-year mean of 39.6%. I am forecasting below the range at 28.0%.

These inputs land RMD in the HOLD zone with a U/D ratio of 2.0. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 9.5%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) is 6.9%, which is less than I seek for a medium-size company. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors this study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 159 studies done in the past 90 days (my study along with 48 outliers excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, projected EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, Forecast Low P/E, and Payout Ratio are 10.0%, 10.0%, 40.0, 28.7, and 44.4%. I am lower across the board. Value Line’s future average annual P/E of 36.0 is higher than both MS (34.4) and mine (26.5).

MS high / low EPS are $9.30 / $4.90 vs. my $9.37 / $6.09 (per share). $4.90/share is less than both ’23 and ’22 EPS, which seems unreasonable to me. The median is $5.87, though. At $4.90/share, my EPS range is decisively higher, which somewhat offsets my lower P/E range. At $5.87, my EPS range is just a tinge higher and hardly worth mentioning.

MS LSPF of $152.80 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 31.2 vs. the above-stated 28.7. MS LSPF is 8.7% greater than the default $4.90/share * 28.7 = $140.63, which results in more aggressive zoning [at $5.87/share, MS LSPF is less than default thereby making for less aggressive zoning]. MS LSPF remains 9.1% greater than mine.

My TAR (over 15.0% preferred) is less than the 13.3% from MS.

MOS backing the current study seems robust.

I track a few different valuation metrics. PEG is 2.8 and 3.1 per Zacks and my projected P/E, respectively: both overvalued. Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] per M* is undervalued at 0.69. Kim Butcher’s “quick and dirty DCF” prices the stock at 30.0 * [$11.15 – ($2.40 + $1.00)] = $232.50 thereby suggesting the stock to be undervalued by 23.0%

I would look to re-evaluate RMD under $175/share to see if TAR qualifies.

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AL Stock Study (7-17-23)

Posted by on September 15, 2023 at 06:24 | Last modified: July 17, 2023 13:20

I recently did a stock study on Air Lease Corp. (AL) with a closing price of $42.45. The original study is here.

Value Line writes:

     > Air Lease Corp. engages in the purchase and leasing of
     > commercial jet transport aircraft to airlines worldwide.
     > It sells aircraft from its operating lease portfolio to
     > third parties, including other leasing companies,
     > financial services companies, and airlines.

Over the past decade, this medium-size company has grown sales 11.1% per year. Earnings have grown 11.3% per year from ’13-’21. The company posts a loss of $1.24/share in ’22 due to aircraft in Russia. From the 2022 10-K:

     > In response to the sanctions, in March 2022 we terminated
     > all of our leasing activities in Russia, consisting of 24
     > aircraft in our owned fleet, eight aircraft in our managed
     > fleet and the leasing activity relating to 29 aircraft that
     > that had not yet delivered from our orderbook, all of which
     > have been subsequently placed. In the first quarter of
     > 2022, we also canceled five aircraft in our orderbook that
     > were slated for delivery in Russia.
     >
     > While we or the respective managed platform maintain title
     > to the aircraft, we determined that it is unlikely we or
     > they will regain possession of the aircraft that are
     > detained in Russia. As a result, we recorded a write-off of
     > our interests in our owned and managed aircraft that are
     > detained in Russia, totaling approximately $802.4 million
     > for the three months ended March 31, 2022. The 21 aircraft
     > that remained in Russia were removed from our fleet as of
     > March 31, 2022.

Sans write-off, I calculate ’22 earnings at $5.67/share rather than -$1.24. For purposes of 5-year projections below, I will lean conservatively and discount by just over 20% to get $4.50/share as my initial value.

Excluding ’22, sales are up and mostly straight while earnings peak in ’19 (excluding ’17 when EPS spikes ~100% due to TCJA). PTPM is higher than peer and industry averages by increasing from 34.2% in ’13 to 40.9% in ’16 before heading down to 25.9% in ’21 for a last-5-year mean (excluding ’22) of 33.2%.

ROE goes from 7.5% in ’13 to 11.4% in ’18 (’17 excluded due to TCJA) before falling to 6.2% in ’21 for a last-5-year mean (excluding ’22) of 9.1%. This is slightly better than peer averages and mostly lower than the industry.

Debt-to-Capital averages 71.8% over the last five years, which is lower than peer and industry averages but still uncomfortably high. M* lists Interest Coverage as 12.7 and Quick Ratio as 0.83. FCF has been negative since at least ’20.

Despite the red flags, M Ramirez writes in this SA article:

     > The main negative point for the market is that Air Lease is
     > a finance company and as such needs a lot of debt to operate
     > on a large scale with the assets it holds. Leverage is
     > currently high (about 2.5 debt/equity), although in no case
     > is the amount of debt greater than the total value of the
     > company’s assets… although a priori the debt seems exorbitant,
     > the company finances more than 95% of the debt at a fixed rate
     > (…close to 3%), which, together with the high predictability
     > of its cash flows, makes it practically impossible for the
     > company to go bankrupt. The company could stop aircraft
     > purchases for 5 years and with the cash flows repay half of
     > the debt without increasing rents to the lessees.

With regard to sales growth:

I am extrapolating out to five years with a forecast lower than the entire range at 12.0%.

With regard to EPS growth:

I am forecasting 14.0% growth—below the long-term-estimate range (mean of four: 17.2%)—and using $4.50/share in ’22 as mentioned above. This results in high EPS of $8.66/share.

In order to project from ’22 on the website, I need to override to the trendline at $0.30 with a 96.0% growth rate to end up at $8.63/share.

My Forecast High P/E is 8.0. From ’13-’21, high P/E ranges from 7.2 (’17) to 18.6 (’13) with a last-5-year mean of 11.7. The last-5-year-mean average P/E is 9.5. I am forecasting near the bottom of the range (only ’17 is lower).

My Forecast Low P/E is 6.0. From ’13-’21, low P/E ranges from 5.0 in ’17 to 14.6 in ’14 with a last-5-year mean of 7.4. I am forecasting near the bottom of the range.

My Low Stock Price Forecast (LSPF) is the default $27.00 based on $4.50/share initial value. This is 36.4% less than the previous close and 9.4% less than the 2022 low.

Over the past decade, Payout Ratio has ranged from 4.8% (’17) to 18.6% (’21) with a last-5-year mean of 13.1% (2022 NMF excluded). I am forecasting conservatively at 5.0%.

These inputs land AL in the HOLD zone with a U/D ratio of 1.7. Total Annualized Return (TAR) is 10.8%.

PAR (using Forecast Average—not High—P/E) of 8.0% is less than I seek for a medium-size company. If a healthy margin of safety (MOS) anchors this study, then I can proceed based on TAR instead.

To assess MOS, I compare my inputs with those of Member Sentiment (MS). Based on 185 studies over the past 90 days (my study and 80 outliers excluded), averages (lower of mean/median) for projected sales growth, EPS growth, Forecast High P/E, Forecast Low P/E, and Payout Ratio are 11.1%, 11.1%, 11.0, 6.0, and 9.0%, respectively. I am only lower on Forecast High P/E, but I’m using the EPS workaround as described above.

MS high/low EPS is $6.96/$3.96 vs. my $8.63/$4.50 (per share). As evidenced by MS mean EPS growth of 32.3%, others have also dealt with significant confusion in figuring out how to deal with negative EPS in ’22. This obscures my ability to determine MOS because MS data are highly scattered.

MS LSPF of $26.20 implies a Forecast Low P/E of 6.6 vs. the above-stated 6.0. MS LSPF is 10.3% greater than the default value of $3.96/share * 6.0 = $23.76, which results in more aggressive zoning. MS LSPF is 3.0% less than mine, however [a rare occurrence].

PEG ratio and Relative Value [(current P/E) / 5-year-mean average P/E] are two valuation metrics I have recently begun to monitor. PEG is 0.64 per Zacks while Relative Value is 1.08 per M* data. These suggest the stock to be undervalued and overvalued, respectively.

I would look to re-evaluate AL under $37/share.

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